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REFORMULATING EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE RELATION-
SHIPS AFTER REFORMULATED GASOLINE: WHAT'S BEST FOR
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT?
SCoTT DANIEL MCBRIDE*
As the twentieth century draws to a close, two global trends
are converging. The first, and more powerful, is the
increasing integration of the world economy, and the
resulting interdependence of domestic and international
policies affecting trade in goods and services .... The
second global trend is the imperative to protect the
environment, and the need for national and international
policies of environmental preservation to reduce the
damages that trade can bring.1
"Allpolitics is local. ,2
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 19, 1996 the Office of the United States Trade
Representative announced that it would no longer pursue a dispute with
the World Trade Organization.' It agreed to implement a ruling that a U.S.
regulation on reformulated gasoline imports was inconsistent with
Washington's obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreement and
recommended that the Environmental Protection Agency change the
current regulations.4
On its face, this announcement seemed no different from any other
Mr. McBride received his B.A. in Public Relations from Ohio Wesleyan University in
1993 and his J.D. from the College of William and Mary School of Law in 1999.
'C. FORD RUNGE, FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT 94 (1994).
2 CHRISTOPHER MATTHEWS, HARDBALL 44 (1988).
' See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States Invites Public Comment on
Next Step in WTO Dispute on EPA Rules for Imported Gasoline (visited Feb. 10, 1999)
<http:llwww.ustr.gov/releases/1996/06/96-54.htll> [hereinafter United States Invites].
USTR Charlene Barshefsky stated that "WTO's Appellate Body underscored that the
WTO Agreements recognize the freedom of its members to protect the environment and
conserve natural resources." Id.
4 See id.
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routine trade decision passed down from the USTR's office. In truth,
however, this short press release symbolized what may very well be a
significant policy shift in how the President, trade professionals, and those
concerned with environmental issues operate in creating and reacting to
American regulatory law.
The announcement was a reaction to a ruling by the World Trade
Organization's (WTO) Appellate Body that certain provisions of the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act were protectionist.' Certain regulations
implementing the Amendments had been created by the Environmental
Protection Agency and approved by Congress, only to be "preempted" by
a very young, very powerful international governing body.
Although the WTO decision is not binding on its face, President
Clinton, through the Trade Representative, has stated that he will
recommend for this "preemption" to occur in the name of foreign
relations.' Indeed, over the last decade, the power of administrative
agencies to revisit decisions agreed upon by Congress in the name of the
President's power of foreign relations has been notably expanded as the
world economy has grown more interdependent.7 At least one critic
argues that "it is necessary to increase formal oversight of the Executive
branch," for fear that this growth in power of the Executive Branch will
diminish the force and power of elective politics
Constitutional scholars are not the only parties disturbed by this
trend. Many environmentalists argue that the free trade movement
5 See Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline (visited Oct. 25, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/
public.html>. See also United States v. Venezuela, 1996 WL 227476 (W.T.O.)
[hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline].
6 See United States Invites, supra note 3.
7 There are several examples of this. Congress has delegated an enormous amount of
foreign relations power to the Executive Branch over the past century. See, e.g., The
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1351-1354, 48 Stat. 943
(1934) (delegating tariff-negotiating authority to the Executive Branch); The Trade Act
of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2111-2116, 93 Stat. 150 (1997) (introducing the historical "fast-
track" provisions that Congress has yet to renew); The International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1706, 91 Stat. 106 (1990) (granting the
President the authority to regulate numerous financial and commercial transactions
involving foreign parties in cases of perceived threats to national security).
8 Aubry D. Smith, Executive-Branch Rulemaking and Dispute Settlement in the World
Trade Organization: A Proposal to Increase Public Participation, 94 MICH. L. REV.
1267, 1270 (1996).
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supports the "race to the bottom" of environmental laws and that
governments will lower their environmental standards in order to promote
the free flow of goods over international borders.9
This Note reviews the Reformulated Gasoline decision and the
power of the World Trade Organization to influence the creation of future
U.S. environmental (and possibly other) laws. It analyzes the actual effect
that the increased power of the Executive Branch may have on
environmental regulation in the United States, and argues that such a shift
in power may actually help strengthen, rather than weaken, environmental
laws. It also distinguishes the decision of the Appellate Body from the
initial Panel Report.
It is argued that the WTO proved a willingness to respect the Clean
Air Act Amendments and would have ruled differently had the EPA
initially attempted to treat foreign and domestic refiners in the same
manner. This premise is strongly supported by the recent Appeals Board
decision in Shrimp-Turtle. This Note therefore concludes by supporting
the premise that WTO dispute settlements may end up aiding U.S.
environmental laws, rather than undermining them.
In spite of a multitude of critics and concerned parties, the best
solution to harmonizing free trade with strong environmental laws is to
allow more oversight to the Executive Branch. For those who are honestly
concerned about ex parte communications in matters concerning
international affairs and domestic environmental regulation, a simple
Executive Order extending notice and comment proceedings for interested
international parties is all that is required. Further legislative interference
should be discouraged and Congress may be the real source of concern for
protecting environmental regulations due to the usage of controversial
riders. Thus, this Note concludes by suggesting that an analysis of the
decision of the Appellate Body in Reformulated Gasoline reveals that
fears of the destruction of domestic environmental laws by the WTO
through the Executive Branch are unwarranted.
II. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
The World Trade Organization came into existence on January 1,
9 See generally DANIEL ESTY, GREENING THE GATT (1994) (giving a good overview of
the concerns of environmentalists in relation to free trade).
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1995,' ° but it actually has a relatively long and complex history. In 1930,
following the crash of the stock market and the resulting economic
slowdown, Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act." The Act was
a reflection of one of the most protectionist periods in the history of
American trade law.12 Its purpose was to help domestic manufacturers by
decreasing the competition from outside producers through "raising tariffs
on dutiable items to an average of 52 percent."' 3 The result was a prime
example of retaliation from major trading partners and a strong
contribution to the economic crisis that quickly gripped the entire planet.14
Congress soon realized the truth of the adage that no man (or
country, for that matter) is an island, and in 1934 it passed the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act. 5 The statute granted the President broad powers
to liberalize trade between the United States and other nations with
bilateral agreements.' 6 Some tariffs were cut as much as fifty percent. 7
The United States was moving away from its isolationist temptations and
toward a position of leadership in the international economy. It was not
until the end of World War II, however, that America would truly become
the international powerhouse that it is today.
Following the war, America and the Allied powers found
themselves at a crucial point in world history. One of the lessons that
history had taught them was that it was extremely important to create
institutions that would help manage intercountry economic relations. 8
Without the frustration of high unemployment and poor economies,
neither World War I nor II might ever have occurred.' 9 Thus, at the
Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the world leaders decided to create an
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, popularly
known as the World Bank) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to
'o See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 85, 86 (1996).
" Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1526 (1999).
1 See BHALA, supra note 10, at 85.
13 EsTY, supra note 9, at 243.
14 See id.
'" The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 19 USCA § 1351 (1999). See also I.
M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITIcs 317 (1995) ("Through successive extensions
and amendments, it also authorized U.S. participation in the first five GATT rounds of
multilateral trade negotiations.").
16 See ESTY, supra note 9, at 243-45.
17 See id.
's See BHALA, supra note 10, at 85-101 (accounting the history of the WTO).
'9 See ESTY, supra note 9, at 243-45.
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"finance postwar development and reconstruction" and "stabilize exchange
rates and official balances of payments."2 The nations also determined
that a new organization to reduce obstacles to trade was necessary, and the
United States proposed an International Trade Organization (ITO) in
1945.21
In 1947, a proposal known as the Havana Charter was written.22
An interim measure, known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), was adopted but it had "no enforcement mechanisms, no
codified rules, and no administrative structure to guide its operations., 23 It
was meant only to be a temporary measure that would be replaced by the
ITO once the Havana Charter had been ratified by member countries.24
Unfortunately for the international trade movement, the ITO's biggest
supporter, the United States, experienced a change in public support for
free trade in the late 1940s and Congress never even voted upon ratifying
the GATT.2 ' Thus, from 1948 until 1995 the GATT was the only
international agreement governing the free trade of goods between
member countries, and was only in force in the United States through an
Executive Order.26
It should be noted that the structure of GATT changed little over
20 Id. at 244.
21 See id.
' See Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT, in BHALA, supra note 10, at 87-89. After World
War II, United States officials attempted to create an International Trade Organization.
A final version of charter proposals were written up, and this group of proposals is
commonly called the Havana Charter. The Charter contained institutional and
substantive provisions not found in the GATT. The GATT went into force on January 1,
1948, while the Havana Charter was never voted upon by Congress. See Patrick Low,
Trading Free, in BHALA, supra note 10, at 90-91.
21 ESTY, supra note 9, at 245.
24 See Dam, supra note 22, at 88.
25 See ESTY, supra note 9, at 244 (noting that GATT was accepted as an executive
agreement "not requiring congressional approval."). See also BHALA, supra note 10, at
85-86. The GATT was put into place by a "presidential agreement to and proclamation
of the effectiveness of the Protocol of Provisional Application." Id.
26 See ESTY, supra note 9, at 245 ("Slow postwar growth... undermined congressional
momentum for a new trade organization. The Truman Administration quietly withdrew
the ITO proposal in 1950."). See also Proclamation No. 2761A, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1947)
(carrying out the GATT 1947); BHALA, supra note 10, at 85 ("President Truman signed
GATT 1947 under the authority of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 that
was extended in 1945."). The United States' acceptance of GATT can be found in 61
Stat. Pt. 5, A2051 (1947).
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the first forty-five years of its existence.27 Nonetheless, there were eight
"rounds" of negotiations that led to several historical cuts in tariffs around
the globe and, in some respects, a growth in the power of the
organization.28 In the most recent "Uruguay Round," over 117 countries
agreed to at least seventeen separate accords that covered both tariff and
non-tariff barriers to trade.29 The Agreement was given "teeth" when a
formal international organization was finally created to enforce both
GATT and all of these other agreements. 3' This organization, the World
Trade Organization (WTO), is the body of international trade dispute that
this note will discuss.3'
In 1994, the House of Representatives and the Senate finally voted
to approve GATT 1947, GATT 1994, and the WTO Agreement.32
President Clinton signed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act on
December 8, 1994, and it took effect on January 1, 1995."
The WTO acts as a source of dispute resolution for countries that
have disagreements over the movement and trade laws of goods and
services. 4 Where the original GATT 1947 did little or nothing to provide
mechanisms by which parties could find a proper settlement," the WTO
provides a forum in which countries make their complaints and agree to
27 SeeBHALA, supra note 10, at 88.
28 See id. at 98 (listing the individual rounds: the Annecy Round, the Torquay Round, the
Geneva Round, the Dillon Round, the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round, and the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations).
29 See ESTY, supra note 9, at 248. Esty notes that there were actually 28 separate accords,
but this number varies depending on how the term "agreements" is determined. See also
RAJ BHALA AND KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT-WTO SYSTEM,
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAW 13-14 (1998).30 See BHALA, supra note 10, at 87.
31 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
32 See BHALA, supra note 10, at 86. See also 140 CONG. REc. HI 1493-01, HI 1535 (daily
ed. Nov. 29, 1994). The House of Representatives voted to appropriate money for the
Uruguay Round Agreement Act on November 29, 1994. See id. The Senate voted to
ratify the Agreement on December 1, 1994. See 140 CONG. REC. S15365-01, S15378
(daily ed. Dec. 1, 1994).
" See The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 480 (1994).
For an exhaustive treatment of the GATT-WTO system, see BHALA & KENNEDY, supra
note 29.34 See Smith, supra note 8, at 1274.35 See BEVERLY EARLE SCHAFFER & FILBERTO AUGUST, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW
AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 336 (1996).
[Vol. 23:299
REFORMULATING RELATIONSHIPS
the decisions of the panels overseeing the case. In the simplest of terms,
WTO is an international legal entity governing the GATT.36
The core principles of GATT are "most favored nation (MFN)
treatment, national treatment, and non-discrimination."37 These principles
are the pillars by which the WTO makes its decisions in every trade
dispute, whether the debate be over GATT terms or other WTO
agreements.38
The WTO seeks to restrain individual governments from insulating
domestic industries from outside competition, similar to the relationship
between the Dormant Commerce Clause and the limitations of individual
states in their ability to restrain interstate commerce.39 Just as state
36 See generally Smith, supra note 8. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) is a system whereby WTO members who
believe other signatories are violating their GATT responsibilities can request the
creation of a Panel. Panels are composed of representatives from various countries and
are created specifically to deal with each complaint. If a party is found by the Panel to be
in violation of the GAIT, that country can appeal to an Appeals Board that is constant
and does not fluctuate from case to case. Panels and the Appeals Board cannot "enforce"
a decision, but they can permit the party harmed by the violation to suspend concessions
to the violating party in the trade of goods or services. See BHALA, supra note 10, at
143-145 (explaining the WTO dispute resolution process). See also Uruguay Round
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 397 (Raj Bhala ed., 1996)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT].
3" Lisa C. Thompson & William J. Thompson, The ISO 9000 Quality Standards: Will
They Constitute a Technical Barrier to Free Trade Under the NAFTA and the WTO?, 14
ARIz. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 155, 178 (1997).
38 See Jeffrey Waincymer, Commentary, Reformulated Gasoline Under Reformulated
WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Pulling Pandora Out of A Chapeau?, 18 MICH. J.
INT'LL. 141, 147 (1996).
" See James H. Snelson, Can GATTArticle III Recover From Its Head-On Collision With
United States Taxes on Automobiles?, 5 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 467 (1996). The
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress shall
have [the power] . . . [t]o regulate [c]ommerce .. .among the several [s]tates." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1-3. The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine basically allows
Congress to place limitations on the power of state governments to regulate interstate
commerce. For example, in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), the
Supreme Court held that an ordinance making certain requirements of local milk
pasteurization within five miles of town was in violation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. A good number of federal laws are enforced through the Dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. See Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and
the Regulatory State: A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1401, 1411-1418 (1994) (explaining the relation between GATT and the
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protectionism is discouraged through the Dormant Commerce Clause in
order to build a stronger union, the WTO's enforcement of lowering
protective or preferential tariffs discourages protectionism by member
nations.40
One of the most important positive results of the Uruguay Round
and the creation of the WTO was:
the introduction of an appellate process. The primary
motivation behind the creation of an appellant process was
to ensure that there was a proper mechanism for reviewing
the findings of panels. This was seen as particularly
desirable once the Uruguay Round negotiators had decided
on automatic adoption of panel reports. Previously, panel
reports were adopted only by consensus; this had led to
problems when losing parties at times blocked adoption of
reports.4
Dormant Commerce Clause).
4 See Snelson, supra note 39, at 467. This analogy has its problems, for states in the
union that choose to ignore the decisions of the federal government may suffer
consequences relatively more severe than members of the WTO who disobey the
international organization's decisions. For example, much of the WTO is enforced
through Most Favored Nation (MEN) benefits. See General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1947, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 34,
at 1-2 (laying down the foundation of the GATT-MFN status. In the most basic of
terms, Article I states that duties imposed on goods from foreign countries should be
equal in amount to the taxes or other burdens placed on domestic "like" goods). See also
The Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2136(a) (West 1997) ("Except as otherwise
provided.., any duty or other import restriction or duty-free treatment proclaimed in
carrying out any trade agreement... shall apply to products of all foreign countries..
."). Outside of particular exceptions, countries found by WTO Dispute Settlement
Panels to be in violation of WTO/GATT provisions, and who thereafter refuse to
appropriately alter protectionist laws, may have their status as a MFN revoked by the
aggrieved WTO members. These countries will be "subject to higher rates of duty" than
those with the status. See BHALA, supra note 10, at 192. Obviously, this differs greatly
from the enforcement procedures used by the Executive Branch in the United States, but
members of the WTO take such economic penalties very seriously. Free, unrestricted
trade can help private interests flourish, which in turn benefits public interests. See
Joseph F. Francois and Clinton R. Shiells, The Dynamic Effects of Trade Liberalization:
A Survey, in BHALA, supra note 10, at 36-44 (explaining the various benefits of free
trade).
"' Waincymer, supra note 38, at 142.
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The first decision to come out of this appellate process was Reformulated
Gasoline,42 discussed later in this Note.
III. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT
When GATT was first drafted and passed in 1947, the environment
was not one of the organization's concerns.43 As the world became more
industrialized, critics arose to voice environmental concerns. "The success
of post-war economic growth has led people in the industrialized North to
focus more on their standard of living and less on absolute wealth
maximization." Eventually, as the environmental movement grew
stronger, and smaller, more limited groups started to ban together in
political force. Air pollution, acid rain, and global warming all became
major international issues in the 1980s and 1990s as "environmental issues
moved beyond domestic policy."'45
Today, it is well recognized around the world that the Earth's
environmental problems are very real.46 It seems only logical that liberal
international trade agreements were criticized for their effects on the
global environment and that GATT's policies and indifference in the area
of environmental protection were the subject of a good amount of
environmental criticism:
When nations exchange goods and services, they also trade
environmental and health risks . . . . Trade and business
interests have slowly... come to recognize the importance
of... ways to integrate environmental concerns into trade
reform . . . . Advocates of more open trade and
environmentalists alike share concerns over how [the two].
. . are to be linked . ... [T]he conflict of cultures and
collision of interests, far from being over, has really only
42 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5.
41 See Peter Hayes, Book Note, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213 (1997) (reviewing C.
FoRiD RUNGE, FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT (1994)).
44 Hayes, supra note 43, at 217.
45 RUNGE, supra note 1, at 4.
46 It is worth noting that even the Vice President of the United States has written a book
on the problems facing biodiversity and environmental regulation. See ALBERT GORE,
JR., EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT (1992).
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begun.47
This growing recognition of the problems facing the environment
and free trade was mirrored during the Uruguay Round when "participants
agreed to include environmental protection as one of the . . .objectives
when establishing the World Trade Organization in 1994." '
The Preamble to the agreement establishing the WTO reads that
parties agree:
[R]elations in the field of trade and economic endeavor
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily
growing volume of real income and effective demand, and
expanding the production of and trade in goods and
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a
manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns
at different levels of economic development.49
Although there are several other agreements enforced by the WTO
that can be related to environmental protection, this Note focuses only on
the significant GATT provisions."
The majority of disputes involving the environment and free trade
are tried under Article XX of the GATT, which prohibits "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries," but allows countries to
47 RUNGE, supra note 1, at 5-6.
41 Elliot B. Staffm, Trade Barrier or Trade Boon? A Critical Evaluation of
Environmental Labeling and Its Role in the "Greening" of World Trade, 21 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 205, 206 (1996). See also Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994)
[hereinafter Final Act].
4 Final Act, supra note 48, at 1144.
o These agreements include the following: The Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS); the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT); the Agreement on Agriculture; the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights; and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures. See generally DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 36. See also
Waincymer, supra note 38, at 145.
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pass laws that are "necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or
health" and laws that are "related to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources."'" A more detailed explanation of Article XX can be
found later in this Note.
IV. THE TUNA-DOLPHIN DISPUTE
The first significant, and arguably the most important, Article XX
decisions to come out of pre-WTO GATT were the Tuna-Dolphin
decisions. 2  Both cases stemmed from a dispute over the Marine
Mammals Protection Act (MMIPA), an American law created to protect
dolphins and other marine mammals from injurious fishing methods. 3
The law fell hardest on Mexican tuna fishermen and Mexico filed a
complaint with the GATT Panel, arguing that restrictions set by the Act
were in violation of the GATT. 54
The initial panel was extremely conservative in its review of the
MMIPA, finding no defense of it under Article XX and, in the process,
successfully expressing to environmentalists that the GATT might be
indifferent to global environmental concerns.55 In November 1991, the
U.S. and Mexico jointly agreed to withdraw from the dispute, agreeing
instead to a bilateral remedy. 6
In June 1994, a GATT panel issued another report on the same
Act.57 The complaint this time was brought by the European Union. 8 The
"' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter Article XX], as presented in ESTY, supra note 9, at 47. For the
entire text of Article XX, See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
52 See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports
of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1598 [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin I]; United
States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, June 1994, 33 I.L.M. 839 [hereinafter
Tuna/Dolphin II]. These decisions are described in Thomas J. Schoenbaum,
International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for
Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1997).
" Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-62, 1371-84, 1401-07,
1411-18, 1421, 1421a-1421h (1994).
" See id. §§ 1361 et seq. See also Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and
Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AMER. J. INT'L L. 700, 700-
04 (1992), reprinted in BHALA, supra note 10, at 1187.
" See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 52.
56 See BHALA, supra note 10, at 1195.
" See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 52.
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report was never officially adopted, but offers important insights into the
interpretation of Article XX 9 The panel indicated that it could recognize
for Article XX(g) purposes that the MMPA constituted a policy to
conserve "exhaustible natural resources"--a welcome change from the
previous Panel decision.' Unfortunately, the Panel refused to recognize
the Act as being "primarily aimed at" the conservation of the exhaustible
natural resources because it forced other contracting parties to change their
policies, impairing the right of access to the United States.6 ' This case
remained the pinnacle GATT environmental case until Reformulated
Gasoline was decided. This narrow definition of "primarily aimed at" 6
would rear its uncompromising, ugly head again in the initial WTO Panel
Reformulated Gasoline6 decision.
See id. See also BHALA supra note 10, at 1209.
s Panel reports that are not adopted still can give some insight into the future standards
that will be used by Panels. Future panels may refer to the decision as giving guidance in
any case. Although GATT Panels are not obligated to follow the precedent of former
Panels, as a rule they do just that. In other words, the decisions are dicta, but they aredicta that can be cited by a Panel in the future in making a determination. Therefore, you
will find reference to Tuna/Dolphin I in the Tuna/Dolphin II decision. See Tuna/Dolphin
II, supra note 52.
o See BHALA, supra note 10, at 1211, 1215.
61 See id. at 1218. This "primarily aimed at" decision was clearly one of the oddestdecisions ever made in the history of statutory interpretation. See id. Rather thanlooking at "primarily aimed at" as basically meaning "the point of the domestic law is to.
. (for example in this case, save dolphins)," the Panel decided that "since a country can
restrict production and consumption only when they are under its jurisdiction, measures
primarily aimed at accomplishing this task cannot be extrajurisdictional, and thus the
exceptions [Article XX] cannot refer to such cases." RUNGE, supra note 1, at 78. In the
simplest of terms, a Panel made up of trade experts decided that U.S. environmental law,
which was really created to save dolphins, did not fit the terms of the Article XX phrase
"primarily aimed at" and could not claim a waiver because it changed the behavior of
other countries that killed dolphins. See BHALA, supra note 10, at 1218. The assumption
of the Panel was that every country can do whatever they want with the environment aslong as they do not try to change the behavior of other countries in their respective
environments. As any school child can tell you, however, the global environment isinterdependent, so such rulings would make U.S. laws protecting shifting environmental
measures useless. For example, dolphins do not follow country borders. Thus, once adolphin swam out of U.S. borders, it could be killed and there is nothing the U.S. could
do about it. It is clear that the Tuna/Dolphin Panels had little concern or respect for
environmental laws.62 BHALA, supra note 10, at 1218.
63See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5.
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V. THE REFORMULATED GASOLINE DECISION
In 1990, the Clean Air Act Amendments implemented two
gasoline programs.' The first program was established to ensure that
pollution levels from gasoline production would not exceed 1990 levels.6"
The second regulation was concerned with reducing pollution in nine
major cities and other areas requested by governors that contained a high
amount of air pollution.66 Congress ordered the Environmental Protection
Agency to establish a "baseline" for each refiner, importer or blender of
gasoline. 7 These "baselines" were certain standards of quality of gasoline
that could be allowed into various cities." The problem lay in the fact that
the EPA determined that the methods by which the baselines could be
measured would be broken into three separate baselines for domestic
refiners, but only one standard baseline for foreign refiners that did not
export seventy-five percent of production to the United States.69
In practice, "virtually none (of the foreign importers) could have
complied with this threshold,"7 so they were stuck with only one,
somewhat harsh baseline standard determined by EPA. For example, the
' See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (1994); Environmental Protection Agency,
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, Final Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 7715, 7789 (1994). The preamble to the Final Rule
states the mission of the regulations:
Through the amended Clean Air Act of 1990, Congress mandated that
EPA promulgate new regulations requiring that gasoline sold in certain
areas be reformulated to reduce vehicle emissions of toxic and ozone-
forming compounds. This document finalizes the rules for the
certification and enforcement of reformulated gasoline and provisions
for unreformulated or conventional gasoline.
Id. at 7716.
6 See Waincymer, supra note 38, at 146.
6 The EPA standards were finalized as the Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives-
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 40 C.F.R. § 80.20 (1998)
[hereinafter Regulation of Fuels]. The Actual Clean Air Amendments are known as the
Air Pollution Control Act (Clean Air Act) Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7671 (1994).
67 See Maury D. Shenk, International Decision: United States-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 669, 670 (1996).
68 See Regulation of Fuels, supra note 66, at 80.70 (listing all the cities and surrounding
counties that are covered by the regulations).69 See Shenk, supra note 67, at 670.
70 Waincymer, supra note 38, at 147.
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Venezuelan national oil company, Petroleous de Venezuela, S.A.
(PDVSA), was one importer who could not meet the seventy-five percent
threshold.7 Venezuela did not meet the baseline standards applicable to
foreign producers and would have lost a great deal of business because of
these limiting instructions if it did not take action in response to the
environmental law. Thus, Venezuela filed a complaint with GATT.72
Soon after Venezuela filed its complaint, the EPA and the
Secretary of State secretly contacted Venezuelan officials and offered to
essentially allow that country to operate under the same regulations as
U.S. domestic refiners in return for Venezuela's promise not to pursue a
complaint that alleged that the Clean Air Act rule violated U.S. obligations
under GATT.73 A confidential cable from Secretary of State Warren
Christopher to the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela was leaked and
Congress and the general public learned of the proposed compromise.7 4
Thus, on March 23, 1994, when the EPA announced the agreement
publicly, it was greeted with a good deal of opposition.75 Although the
EPA recommended limited individual baselines, "fully equal treatment for
foreign refiners was never advocated, on the stated policy basis that there
would be general problems with verifying data and particular avoidance
problems given the difficulty of identifying and distinguishing between
different batches of gasoline."76 Congress forced the EPA to abandon the
compromise with Venezuela by inserting a "rider" in an EPA
appropriations bill that rejected the rule change.77
"' See Smith, supra note 8, at 1267 n.3. The olefm content of Venezuelan gasoline was
three times higher than the U.S. refinery-industry average. Olefins contribute to ozone
formation.72 See id. at 1267.
" See id.
74 See, e.g., Lawmaker Rips Gasoline Rules' Delay, Hous. CHRON., June 23, 1994,
available at 1994 WL- 4212640 at *1 (explaining that John Gingell, House Energy and
Commerce Committee Chairman, "blasted the administration for backing off a plan to
hold foreign refiners to strict standards for the clean gas, and said it appeared the
administration cut a deal with Venezuela to avert a trade fight.").
" Notably, the agreement would have "led to a slight increase in pollution levels in the
northeastern United States." Smith, supra note 8, at 1268.
76 Waincymer, supra note 38, at 148.
" See Smith, supra note 8, at 1267. This entire situation would later haunt the United
States in its appeals process at the WTO. During the March announcement, the EPA
showed a willingness to provide for conditional, limited foreign baselines. It was
therefore impossible to make the claim that there were no alternatives available to the
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Once it was clear that there would be no further diplomatic
discussion between the United States and Venezuela, the South American
country was joined by its neighbor, Brazil, in challenging the baseline
standards under the new WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes.78 The European Community and
Norway later joined as third parties to the complaint. This was the first
WTO dispute resolution to proceed since the WTO's creation.79
A. The Complaints
Before continuing, it should be clarified that most WTO disputes
involving domestic environmental laws center around the aforementioned
provision of GATT-Article XX:8°
ARTICLE XX-GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
United States, as may have been possible otherwise. See also H.R. 4624, 103d Cong.
(1994) ("None of the funds provided in this Act may be used during fiscal year 1995 to
sign, promulgate, implement or enforce the requirement proposed as 'Regulation of Fuels
and Fuel Additives: Individual Foreign Refinery Baseline Requirements for
Reformulated Gasoline' at Volume 59 of the Federal Register at pages 22800 through
22814"); Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5.
7 See Shenk, supra note 67, at 670.
'9 See Waincymer, supra note 38, at 142.
" See generally Article XX, supra note 51. See also DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 36, at 44.
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consumption."
Most environmental laws naturally impede free trade, as they
usually restrict the free movement of goods and services in the name of
environmental welfare. In most circumstances, as a document that
promotes international free trade, GATT attempts to limit individual
Member laws and regulations that restrict the flow of goods and services.8"
Article XX was created as an exception to this: it allows countries to pass
environmental laws to protect their citizens if certain criteria are met.83 In
the case of Reformulated Gasoline, Article XX and this required criteria
would be key to the eventual outcome of the Appeals Board decision.84
Venezuela and Brazil presented four complaints to the initial Panel
in Reformulated Gasoline. They complained that: first, the regulations
were contrary to the "most favored nation"(MFN) requirement of Article I
of GATT; second, the regulations were counter to the National Treatment
requirement of Article III of GATT 1994; third, measures were in breach
of Article 2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers of Trade (TBT); and
fourth, the provisions of the Clean Air Act were not exempted by Article
XX of GATT 1994."5
Considering the environmentally-unfriendly decision made by the
GATT Panel in the initial Tuna-Dolphin case,86 it was no great surprise
that the Panel ruled conservatively.
The Panel found the following. First, clean air is an "exhaustible
81 Article XX, supra note 51 (emphasis added). The introduction paragraph is called the
"chapeau," as will be discussed later in the text of this Note. Provisions (b) and (g) are
the environmental exceptions. Other sections of Article XX not listed here includeprison labor, national treasures of artistic, historic and archaeological value, theprotection of public morals, and others. See Article XX, supra note 51, art. XX(e), (f),(a).
82 See ESTY, supra note 9, at 47-51 (explaining the creation of Article XX and details
about its application).
" See id.
8' See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5.
" See Waincymer, supra note 38, at 148-49; United States-Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Panel, Jan. 29, 1996, Law and Practice of theWorld Trade Organization, Dispute Resolution Binder 1, at 7-9 [hereinafter PanelReport]. For purposes of this Note, the fourth complaint is the only complaint that will
be examined thoroughly.
86 See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 51; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 51.
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natural resource" within the meaning of Article XX (g).17 Secondly, these
provisions did indeed defy Article III:4 because imported and domestic
gasoline were 'like products.'88 Under the baseline establishment rules of
the Gasoline regulations, imported gasoline was effectively prevented
from benefiting from favorable sales conditions that were afforded
domestic gasoline by an individual baseline tied to the producer of a
product. Thus, imported gasoline was treated "less favorably" than
domestic gasoline.89
The third decision was that it was not necessary to see if the
necessary requirements of Article 1:1 or Article 2 of the TBT were met
because of the finding on Article II1:4.90 Finally, the baseline
establishment rules found to be inconsistent with Article I:4 could not be
justified under Article XX(g) as a measure "relating to" the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources. 91
The United States was pleased with the Panel's conclusion that
clean air was a "exhaustible natural resource," but was nonetheless
dissatisfied with the Panel's other findings. The American government
did not disagree that the baseline establishments were contrary to Article
1:1, Article 1I:4, and the TBT agreement.92 On appeal, it focused on the
defense that its actions fell under the exceptions of Article XX.93
America claimed that the regulations enforcing the Clean Air
Amendments were clear examples of laws whose primary purpose was
protecting the environment and that these laws were instituted in a
87 See Panel Report, supra note 85, at 62.
88 See id. at 52.89 See id.
9' See id. at 53.
9' See id. at 36.
92 [T]he United States does not appeal from the findings or rulings made
by the Panel on, or in respect of, the consistency of the baseline
establishment rules under Article 1:1, Article III:1, Article III:4, and
Article XXXIII:I(b) of the General Agreement and the applicability of
Article XX(b) and Article XX(d) of the General Agreement and of the
TBTAgreement.
Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5, at 8.
9' See id. ("[I]t is also the view of the United States that the Panel erred in failing to
proceed further in its interpretation and application of Article XX(g), and in not finding
that the baseline establishment rules satisfy the other requirements of Article XX(g) and
the introductory provisions of Article XX.").
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reasonable manner.94 The United States justified its distinction between
foreign and domestic baselines as necessary because of the difficulties
which the EPA would have had to face in verifying the reformulation
processes of every foreign gasoline importer.9 The U.S. claimed that it
would be extremely difficult to verify information and enforce baselines
on a fungible commodity such as gasoline.96
Environmentalists and investors around the world looked with
great interest to the decision of the WTO Appellate Body. First, this was
the first appeal to reach the Appellate Body. If the Appellate Body had
merely affirmed the decision of the panel without comment, then future
disputants may have been dissuaded from bothering to expend energy,
time and resources on the appeals process.97 Second, because the
environmental-trade debate continued to rage even louder and stronger,
observers watched with keen interest to see how the Appellate Body
would treat domestic environmental laws that had an ancillary effect on
trade.98 Thankfully, the Appellate Body decision differed in its analysis
from the Panel and did indeed uphold the validity of a wide range of
domestic environmental laws.
B. The Appellate Decision
The Appellate Body agreed with both the Panel and the United
States that clean air was an exhaustible natural resource. 99 However, this
was where the similarity in the two rulings ended. The Appellate Body
evaluated the Panel's reliance on an earlier GATT decision, Herring and
94 See id.
95 See id. at 26. See also Panel Report, supra note 85, at 55. The United States also
relied on:
(1) the impossibility of determining the refinery of origin for each
imported shipment, (2) the incentive to "game" the system, thereby
making it harder on exporters and importers, and (3) the difficulty for
the United States to exercise an enforcement jurisdiction with respect
to a foreign refinery, since the Gasoline Rule required criminal and
civil sanctions in order to be effective.
Id.
9 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5, at 25.
97 See generally Waincymer, supra note 38 (explaining the importance of the first
Appellate decision).
98 See generally id.
99 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5, at 19.
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Salmon," in which another GATT Panel determined that under Article
XX(g), the phrase "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources" meant that the law had to be primarily aimed at the
conservation of those resources.' The Panel determined that the Clean
Air provisions at issue in Reformulated Gasoline were not primarily aimed
at preserving clean air, so Article XX(g) was not applicable. 2
The Appellate Body recognized the problem with this logic. Using
the traditional cannons of statutory interpretation, the court noted that
Article XX is divided into two sections. 3 Logically, the first section to be
reviewed is the specific listing of exceptions, (a) through (g)."0 If these
exceptions are met, any analysis of Article XX still has to look at the
introductory "chapeau."'' 5 The chapeau states that even if the exceptions
are met, an Article XX exception will not be allowed if there are logical
alternatives to trade barriers (e.g., negotiations). 6
In the chapeau, it seems clear that the exceptions at issue are not
the "legal conclusions" that result from the passage of a law, but the actual
measures taken by the agency.0 7 For example, in this case the Panel
looked at the "less favorable treatment" that resulted from the different
baseline standards and said that they were not primarily aimed at
improving air standards. 8 In fact, the Appellate Body determined that it
was not the specific treatment of the regulations, but the overall focus of
the law, or measures, that should have been used to determine the problem
that the regulations were drafted to solve. 9 The Appellate Body noted
that the Clean Air Act Amendments, and the baseline standards in
particular, were created to help the environment."0 One of the effects of
specific provisions was to impede trade, but this was not the "primary
"o See Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, Mar.
22, 1988, WTO B.I.S.D. at para. 4.6 (1988).
.0. See Panel Report, supra note 85, at 64 (emphasis added).
'
02 See id. at 44-45.
03 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5, at 21 (describing Article XX's chapeau and
separate provisions). The "chapeau" is just another name for the beginning paragraph of
the Article and is far broader than the specific provisions that follow it.
'o See id. at 19.
205 See id. "Chapeau" in this case means the introductory paragraph to Article XX.
'
06 See id. at 25.
207 Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5, at 21.
See Panel Report, supra note 85, at 44.
o9See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5, at 16.
"o See id. at 19.
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aim" of the measures, and the Appellate Body (rightfully) found that the
baseline standards did indeed meet the criteria of general exception under
Article XX(g). "'
The Appellate Body recognized that it could not make assumptions
on the interpretation of the underlying purpose of the U.S. regulations, so,
citing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it stated, "[a] treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose."1"2 Without baselines, there would be no way for the
environmental standards to be applied in the first place and the Appellate
Body acknowledged this."3 The Appellate Body therefore determined that
it was necessary to look at the baseline standards in the most positive of
lights. If on its face the law appeared to be primarily intended to protect
the environment, then, according to the Appellate Body, that was how the
WTO should attempt to view it for purposes of Article XX(g).1 4
After making the determination that the regulations were
"primarily aimed at" protecting the environment, the Appellate Body
completed its review of Article XX(g) by applying the phrase "if made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption.""' The Appellate Body determined that this phrase was not
intended by the framers of Article XX to be a causation, or "empirical
effects test.""' 6 Venezuela and Brazil attempted to argue that under
GATT, rules had to not only have a conservation purpose, but also had to
have "some positive conservation effect"' in order to successfully fall
under Article XX(g) protection."' The Appellate Body rejected this
argument, noting that determining cause of specific effects (for example,
the exact source of the CFCs leading to a hole in the ozone layer) is in
most cases extremely difficult, if not impossible."9  In the case of
environmental laws, "a substantial period of time, perhaps years, may have
to elapse before the effects attributable to implementation of a given
..' See id. at 18-19.
"
2 Id. at 17.
13 See id.
114 See id.
115 See id.
1 6 See id. at 21.
"t7 Id. at 20.
118 See id.
119 See id.
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measure may be observable."' 20 Therefore, it was enough under Article
XX(g) that the purpose of the provision be to protect an exhaustible
natural resource, as long as domestic and international businesses were
both burdened by the standards.'
As noted above, even if a domestic law meets the criteria of an
exception, if it is "arbitrary discrimination," "unjustifiable discrimination,"
or a "disguised restriction," then it fails the criteria of the chapeau. 2 The
United States believed that its regulations were justifiable and argued that
it would have been extremely difficult to verify foreign baselines and to
enforce such measures.2 3 The Panel rebutted that there were established
techniques for checking, verifying, assessing and enforcing data related to
imported goods.14 From this argument came the question of the honesty
of the United State's claims. Logically, the Appellate Body asked if the
United States had pursued the possibility of entering into "cooperative
arrangements with the governments of Venezuela and Brazil or, if it had,
not to the point where it encountered governments that were unwilling to
cooperate. '' ns  Apparently, the standards had been created with the
assumption that the task of enforcement of foreign refiners was too
difficult to allow individual countries to create their own credible
baselines.
The United States found itself in an awkward situation. It claimed
that it was too difficult to come to an agreement with other countries and
discrimination was necessary, while a few months earlier the EPA stated,
following the secret talks with Venezuela, that baseline "discrimination"
was not necessary to meet the objectives of the Clean Air Act
Amendments.1
2 6
The very purpose of the World Trade Organization is to facilitate a
type of "economic harmonization" among participating nations, promoting
the free flow of goods and services across national borders. The United
States could have invited comment from foreign businesses and other
nation states affected by the standards, but it did not do so. Thus, the
provisions violated the chapeau requirements and constituted
120 id.
121 See id.
'2 See id. at 24.2 See id. at 25.
124 See id. at 27.
12 5 Id.
126 See Smith, supra note 8, at 1269.
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"unjustifiable discrimination" and a "disguised restriction on international
trade."'127 On April 26, 1996, the Appellate Body recommended that the
Dispute Settlement Body request that the United States bring the baseline
establishment rules into conformity with the GATT'28 and less than a
month later, United States Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky
announced in a press release that the United States would accept the
WTO's interpretation of the U.S. regulations, and recommend the
implementation of less discriminatory reformulated gasoline standards. 2 9
VI. POSSIBLE RESULTS OF THE REFORMULATED GASOLINE DECISION
The outcome of Reformulated Gasoline generates at least two
concerns. First, there are those who fear that by allowing Venezuela (and
other) refiners to enter the market with substantially less security that
certain environmental standards are being met, America might be joining
the environmental "race to the bottom." 30  The United States' quick
acceptance of the decision certainly appears to indicate an intent to
continue this trend.
A more frequent concern is that the free trade movement will put
pressure on countries with high environmental standards to reduce the
127 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5, at 28. Some critics were disturbed by this
ruling. Where the Appellate Body appeared to soften its stance on what was classified
under XX(g), it also "revived the argument that a country must seek international
agreements or arrangements with foreign entities," which panels since Tuna/Dolphin I
did not choose to raise. See Chris Wold, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the
GATT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENVT'L. L. 841, 862 (1996). Although Mr. Wold is
correct in asserting that no other Panel had chosen to raise this issue, the reasoning for
this seems simple-no other Panel decision was open enough to environmental
regulations to get this far into the analysis. It seems apparent that if Tuna Dolphin II or
the original Panel decision had determined XX(g) was met, since the GATT/WTO is
premised on nondiscrimination principles and respect for individual country sovereignty
when necessary, inevitably the underlying harmonization effect of rules and standards
would have led to a requirement of open communication between WTO signatories.
121 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5, at 29.
29 See United States Invites, supra note 3. The agency's proposed and final rules
revising the imported gasoline requirements can be found in the Federal Register at 62
Fed. Reg. 24,776 (1997), and 62 Fed. Reg. 45,533 (1997), respectively.
13o See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Globalization and Its Challenges for Law and Society, 29
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 891, 895 (1998) (describing Ralph Nader's fear that free trade will lead
to a race to the bottom in both environmental and labor standards).
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rigor of their environmental requirements. 3' This differs from the "race to
the bottom" in that, instead of countries willingly lowering environmental
standards to draw business in, countries that try to do the right thing will
actually be punished and unwillingly forced into the "race." The first
concern is that countries will want to lower standards; the second concern
is that they will have to do so in order to survive economically.
The argument makes a good deal of sense. Imagine that the United
States passes certain clean air provisions with which only the largest of
manufacturers can afford to comply. Suppose Canada, on the other hand,
decides to make its laws extremely lax. A smaller international business
may decide to open up its factory in Canada because the costs of
compliance to the clean air provisions in the United States are too
expensive.
In order to show how volatile the situation can be, imagine that
smaller American domestic industries decide that they will close their
businesses and move to Canada as well, again because the costs of
compliance are too high. Members of Congress will eventually react as
constituents lose their jobs, and the environmental law will most likely be
repealed. This is an extreme case, obviously, and there is significant data
to show that spending on pollution control is so small that it would never
be the only cause to leave the country and move elsewhere.13
Nonetheless, it is a genuine concern and one might be able to imagine that
regulations requiring certain standards of gasoline might eventually be
lowered to attract certain businesses in the same way.
Certain environmentalists fear that other countries will lower their
standards and, in the name of free trade, that the United States will follow
suit. Although few critics doubt that "trade liberalization can lead to
positive scale effects in augmenting growth and the financial resources
"'t See Schoenbaum, supra note 54, at 268 (describing the Tuna/Dolphin case). See also
David S. Ardia, Does the Emperor Have No Clothes? Enforcement of International Laws
Protecting the Marine Environment, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 497, 503 (1998) ("Due to the
operation of competitive international markets, the existence of less protective
environmental regimes may undermine the willingness of a State to enact comparatively
stricter environmental standards.").
132 See ESTY, supra note 9, at 159. Environmental laws were centralized in the federal
government under the EPA in reaction to the perceived "race to the bottom" that was
occurring among states. See id. at 161. The key case that verified the power of the
federal government to regulate the environment was Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137
(1970).
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that can be used to tackle environmental problems"'33 the concern is that if
the free trade movement is pushed above all other concerns, our
environmental laws will be watered down in order to meet WTO
standards. '34  GATT is quick to acknowledge when environmental
standards are "too high" to be a burden on trade, but no comparable
measure of "too low" exists for those countries that ignore environmental
laws, reduce manufacturing costs, and therefore are able to practice what
one might call unfair trade practices because other countries are attempting
to be responsible. The urge, under a free trade regime, may be to cut our
own standards rather than force others to strengthen their own laws.'35
Elected officials have to answer to their constituents, and if
constituents are injured because of environmental laws, chances are that
government will react by lowering standards. Daniel Esty notes that
during the debate over the Clean Air Act Amendments "U.S. companies
argued that the added regulations would be extremely costly and seriously
disadvantage them in international markets."' 36 Esty calls this weakening
of support for environmental regulations through economic pressure
"political drag."' 137
Environmental laws can end up far less popular with the American
public than they were initially. For example, a log export ban in the
Pacific Northwest that was accompanied by a spotted owl reservation led
"' Candice Stevens, The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and
the Re-emergence of the Trade and Environment Debate, in TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 83, 91 (1993).
"' See Shannon Hudnall, Towards a Greener International Trade System: Multilateral
Environmental Agreements and the World Trade Organization, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 175, 202-209 (1996) (noting that even multilateral environmental treaties and
agreements might be at risk under the WTO analysis of Tuna/Dolphin I & II).
,35 See ESTY, supra note 9, at 232. See also David Wirth, International Trade
Agreements: Vehicles for Regulatory Reform?, 1997 U. CHIC. LEGAL F. 331, 334 (1997)
("One regime-the environment-is designed to facilitate the implementation of
affirmative governmental measures, and the other-trade-is intended to ensure the
absence of such measures.").
136 See ESTY, supra note 9, at 23 n.11 (referring to the article Politics in the Air, NAT'L J.,
May 6, 1989, at 1098). Similar arguments were made in opposition to President
Clinton's 1993 proposal for a BTU tax. See id. (referring to the article, Merits of
Increased U.S. Energy Taxes at Issue, OIL & GAs J., Feb. 1, 1993, at 15). See also BOB
WOODWARD, THE AGENDA 218 (1994) ("In the Congressional negotiations, so many
exceptions and exemptions had been given away-for aluminum, the airlines and other
industries-that the whole principle of a broad energy tax had been subverted.").
137 ESTY, supra note 9, at 23.
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to a decline in domestic harvesting.3 3 The result was higher domestic log
prices and lumber prices, not to mention a threat to local employment. 39
These negative effects on the community explain why local interests
sometimes vilify environmental legislation and lobby Congress to carve
out exceptions. Considering this reasoning, it seems not unrealistic to
expect that a "race to the bottom" might exist, not because outside
economies are pressuring us, but because environmental laws,
unfortunately, can become very unpopular in certain geographic regions. 40
VII. THE WEAKENING OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
While many environmentalists may look at the result of WTO
decisions and complain about the overall pro-trade, anti-environmental
stance of Panel rulings, there are scholars who claim that the problem is
much greater than bad environmental decisions. 4' They claim that the
very process by which the Executive Branch negotiates deals with other
countries and recommends changes to domestic regulations is flawed.'42 It
is argued that as the United States participates ever more frequently in the
WTO, foreign policy and domestic policy will increasingly blend in many
areas, placing the delicate balance of power between the Executive and
Legislative Branches at risk.'43
It is no great secret that the WTO is much less tolerant of non-tariff
barriers than was the original GATT agreement.'" Reformulated Gasoline
138 See Ed Barbier, The Environmental Effects of Trade in the Forestry Sector, in THE
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRADE 55, 88 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development ed., 1994).
39 See id. at 88-89.
'40 Such unpopularity is not limited to geographic bias. Imagine if Congress passed a law
raising the price of all gasoline by 20 cents a gallon in response to poor air quality.
There would be certain consumers that would call for fewer restrictions on environmental
control merely because their pocketbook was affected, placing their desire for profit and
income maximization over health and safety concerns.
141 See generally Smith, supra note 8; Wirth, supra note 135.
'
42 See Smith, supra note 8, at 1270; Wirthsupra note 135, at 363.
"n3 See Smith, supra note 8, at 1270-1280; Wirth, supra note 135, at 363.
'"See Smith, supra note 8, at 1272. See ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 204-209, in BHALA, supra note 10, at 261-265 (covering the
fall of Tariffs and the rise of Non-Tariff Barriers to trade, including export subsidies,
credit guarantees and tax incentives to particular industries). Gilpin notes that the
original GATT said nothing about Non-Tariff Barriers, and it wasn't until the Kennedy,
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is a good example of this, as the reformulated gasoline standards were by
no means tariff-related and yet the Appellate Body still found
discrimination. 45  The United States eventually changed its domestic
regulations to conform to the WTO ruling, 46 a decision that critics fear
will lead to the undermining of many other laws that have been created
through years of Congressional oversight, debate and lobbying. 47
A. A Congressional Oversight Loophole
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act 4 contains provisions that
enable Congress to control the Executive Branch's role in settling trade
disputes through an adjudicative process. 49  Thus, in Reformulated
Gasoline, when the Office of the Trade Representative chose to appeal the
decision to the WTO Appellate Body, it was required to "give notice to the
appropriate congressional committees of the nature of the dispute, the
composition of the panel, and set forth a notice in the Federal Register
raising the major issues."'"5 Thus, the Legislative Branch holds a "check"
over the Executive Branch whenever the President wishes to pursue formal
action in the World Trade Organization.
The key word in all of this process is the term "formal." Nothing
prohibits the President, through the USTR, the Secretary of State or other
executive officers from making Congress aware of informal, ex parte
communications and negotiations.'' This means that if the USTR fears
Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds that Members decided to deal with the issue. See id.
'
4s See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5, at 25.
See EPA Proposed and Final Rules, supra note 129.
'
47 See Smith, supra note 8, at 1270; Wirth, supra note 135, at 363.
148 Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
149 See Smith, supra note 8, at 1276-1279.
50 Id. at 1277.
,'5 See id. at 1270. See also 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (1994) ("exempting rulemaking from
the public-notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act... to
the extent that there is involved ... [a] foreign affairs function of the United States.").
Currently, the interpretation of the APA's foreign-affairs exception applies when
agencies issue, modify, or rescind rules in order to implement an international agreement.
See, e.g., International Board of Teamsters v. Pennsylvania, 17 F.3d 1478, 1486 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (holding that a rule modification pursuant to a mutual understanding with
Mexico was within the foreign-affairs exception of § 553). The Courts have chosen to be
very deferential to the power of the Executive Branch in making foreign policy. See
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
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that a country will file a complaint with the WTO, it can secretly contact
the complaining Member and informally decide to "reform" U.S. domestic
regulations so that they conform to the desires of the affected country.1 2
As noted earlier, this is what happened when the EPA and Secretary of
State met with Venezuela and came to an agreement to modify the
regulations.'53
This loophole in Congressional oversight ignores the growing
power of the Executive Branch. At various times over the past century,
Congress has intentionally delegated a good deal of foreign policy power
to the President in matters of trade negotiation.'54 As WTO decisions
grow in number and frequency, it seems likely that many U.S. regulations
will come under fire by affected international industries and countries.
Under this perception, as the President secretly negotiates with affected
countries in these circumstances, Congress will find itself even less
involved in foreign policy matters, involved in this process only at the
very end-such as when the EPA requests appropriations. 5'
As mentioned earlier in this Note, after the initial EPA-Venezuela
agreement that modified U.S. regulations, Congress refused to comply
with the agreement and denied appropriations to implement the regulations
'
5 2 See Smith, supra note 8, at 1270.
153 See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
154 Since the early 1970s, Congress has granted the power of "fast track" negotiation to
the President. This trade tool has historically allowed the President to introduce
legislation with no permissible amendments "contrary to ordinary procedure in
Congress." Wirth, supra note 135, at 353. Congress recently rejected President Clinton's
request for the "fast track" ability, severely restraining his trade negotiation power. See
143 CONG. REc. S12520-03 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997), 143 CONG. REC. S12631-01
(daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) and 143 CONG. REC. S12456-01 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1997)
(containing speeches given by Senators Dorgan, Snowe, and Ford on why they supported
the defeat of the fast track legislation). In actuality, President Clinton and former House
Majority Leader Newt Gingrich chose to pull the legislation when it was clear there were
not enough votes. See also 143 CONG. REc. E2338-01 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1997), 143
CONG. REC. E2372-03 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997), and 143 CONG. REC. E2345-03 (daily
ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (giving similar explanations, but by House members Marcy Kaptur,
Jerry F. Costello, and Ron Paul).
13' See Smith, supra note 8, at 1278. See also Uruguay Round Trade Agreement,
Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316 (1994), in BHALA, supra
note 10, at 129 ("If there is a conflict between U.S. law and any of the Uruguay Round
agreements, section 102(a) of the implementing bill makes clear that U.S. law will take
precedence.").
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through a rider. 6 This may have been an effective way of dealing with
"watered-down U.S. law" caused by foreign interference in this particular
situation, but critics argue that as the WTO continues to force the
modification of U.S. laws, it will be less and less of a reality to expect
Congress to intervene "every time international negotiations lead to rule
changes.""'57 Thus, it is argued that in effect the executive body will
eventually succeed in extending its power to alter U.S. domestic laws in
response to international pressure, a process referred to by one critic as the
"erosion of democracy."s 8
VIII. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLVING THE CONGRESS EVEN MORE
In comparing the fear of the "race to the bottom" of environmental
standards with the fear that democratic checks and balances are being
compromised through the growth of the Executive Branch, one cannot
help but realize that a great number of critics are uncomfortable with the
growing presence and power of the WTO. With the growing
interdependence of the global market, it appears that the Executive Branch
is extending its reach (and will continue to do so) into territory
traditionally supervised by, or of no concern to, the Legislative Branch.5 9
Many environmentalists fear extension of this phenomenon to the realm of
environmental regulation, claiming it may lead us to the environmental
"bottom.,,'60
It appears that after the Reformulated Gasoline decision, from an
environmentalist's perspective, this movement toward one global standard
and a stronger presidency may help strengthen environmental laws rather
than weaken them. Indeed, if any change is to be made in the United
156 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
151 Smith, supra note 8, at 1278.
.. See id. at 1285. One of the specific suggestions that Smith makes to stop this "erosion
of democracy" is to expand the applications of the Trade Act of 1974 which currently
requires the U.S. Trade Representative to consult private-sector representatives
representing both trade and non-trade interests while negotiating settlements. This Note
will not discuss this suggestion, as it does not include congressional oversight in its
applications.
'" See Wirth, supra note 135, at 363 ("[T]here is a considerable risk that the Executive
branch will act unilaterally with few, if any, restrictions . . . in areas of domesticjurisdiction that happen to fall within the purview of international trade agreements.").
,60 See Fox, supra note 130, at 895. See also ESTY, supra note 9, at 159.
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States' governance structure that will help guarantee a positive future for
both the economy and the environment, it is the granting of more power,
not less, to the executive office. 6'
Members of Congress are better at dealing with domestic issues
than international issues. Tip O'Neill will be remembered for many
things, but arguably first among them will be the phrase "[a]ll politics is
local."'62 Members of the House of Representatives are elected every two
years and represent smaller geographic areas than either Senators or the
President. Therefore, in theory, Representatives are expected to be
focused on the problems facing local communities and must constantly be
responsive to those problems or face removal from office. Senators tend
to be less affected by this policy of placing geographic area concerns
ahead of the concerns of the entire country, but the trend is still far more
prevalent in either House of the Legislative Branch than in the Oval
Office.163
The President holds much trade policy-making authority largely
because of this "local politics" tendency. Congress tends to be more
protectionist because until recently, voting for a free trade measure could
be political suicide for those members who represent constituents who live
in areas adversely affected by businesses moving overseas."
The President is in a unique position to determine what is best for
161 Please note that this Note only supports increased strength of the Executive Branch for
regulations related to the environment. Other regulations regulated by administrative
agencies, such as employment and medical issues, are not addressed because the majority
of environmental issues are unique because short-term exceptions and developments are
more likely to have long-term, irreversible effects.
162 [ATTHEWS, supra note 2, at 44.
163 See I. M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 5 (1995).
Congress is a decentralized, undisciplined institution, particularly susceptible to
pressure from organized interests. So if it "does what comes naturally," if the
politics of benefit seeking and log-rolling goes unimpeded, the result will be a
high level of trade barriers, to the benefit of certain groups and the detriment of
the nation as a whole. For a politician who must respond to concentrated
interests, a vote for lowering trade barriers is therefore, as one formal official
put it, an "unnatural act."
Id.
" See BHALA, supra note 10, at 311 ("Major international trade legislation since World
War II evince a shift in power from the Congress to the Executive branch."). See also
Starkist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 275 F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A. 1959) (giving a detailed
description of the various powers held by the Legislative and Executive Branches in
regulating and enforcing U.S. foreign policy).
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the country overall in issues involving trade, because while one area of the
country may be economically depressed by the export of business
overseas, other American communities may discover a major boom thanks
to the same trade agreements. 6
5
America is both the world's top importer and top exporter.166 It
should come as no surprise that the United States has used the GATT
dispute settlement to its benefit "more than any other trading partner."' 6
7
Considering the historical movement of the world toward free trade and
America's historical support of this movement, it is irrationally paranoid
to claim that we should now suddenly fear the WTO and the power it will
have over domestic policy. 6s The WTO has no power unless the
Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch choose together to allow
such power to be enforced. 69
A. The Effects of Special Interests
In response to the fear of the uncontrolled growth of the Executive
Branch discussed earlier, 170 some critics propose more congressional
oversight.'7' Such oversight would most likely involve congressional
committees, private sector advisory committees, and the involvement of
the general public in a fashion similar to the system already set up with
adjudication oversight.72 It is argued that by implementing such a
165 See BHALA, supra note 10, at 311.
'66 See World Trade Growth Accelerated in 1997, Despite Turmoil in Some Asian
Financial Markets (visited Nov. 20, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/intltrad/
intemat.htil> (showing that the United States is now ranked first among both importers
(899.2 C.I.F.) and exporters (688.9 F.O.B.)).
167 Smith, supra note 8, at 1278. See also Gary Horlick, Dispute Resolution Mechanism:
Will the United States Play by the Rules?, J. WORLD TRADE, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1995, at
163.
161 The Judicial Branch has traditionally given great deference to the President in most
areas of foreign policy. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936). See also United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A.
1975) (reaffirming Curtiss-Wright and reemphasizing the need for a strong Executive
Branch in foreign policy).
169 See Smith, supra note 8, at 1279 ("Congress can control the impact of WTO law
merely by refusing to modify laws to comply with the agreement.").
170 See supra notes 141-158 and accompanying text.
171 See Smith, supra note 8, at 1281-1287.
172 See id.
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program, many of the agreements that administrative agencies would
otherwise change without the notice of Congress would be
"democratized."' 73  More lawmakers would therefore be aware of
important regulatory decisions and more voices would be included in the
process of changing domestic laws to meet WTO standards. 174 Although
in theory it sounds nice for the sake of democracy, this is not necessarily a
worthwhile ambition. In fact, such legislative interference could help
destroy the movement toward a less-protectionist world.
James Madison was a fan of the separation of powers of
government and of larger government overall.' 75  He feared that the
greatest enemy to a strong government was the domination by economic
and ideological factions. 176 By dividing the federal government into three
branches, then dividing the most powerful branch, Congress, into two
parts, the Framers hoped to dilute the effects of regional factions around
the country. 17 7 Federal representatives would therefore be free as much as
possible from the power of factionalism and, it was hoped, do what was
best for the country.' 78 Madison, however, could not predict that the world
would change as much as it has.
Today, communications between states, and individuals, is
instantaneous; transportation can bring us anywhere in a matter of hours;
and special interests govern the outcome of political elections like never
before. In the 1996 election alone, over $660 million was spent on
electing members to Congress.'79 Members of the House and Senate are
forced to run lavish campaigns with exorbitant amounts of money to pay
for the publicity-money that is usually donated for a cost or with
conditions attached. Many argue that "the unequal deployment of
resources in electoral campaigns causes the wrong people to get elected,
distorting the true preferences of voters."'8
173 See id.
174 See id.
,71 See FEDERALISTNO. 10, at 77-78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
176 See id.
177 See Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 335, 335 (1990).
178 See id.
171 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 663, 663 (1997).
"' Id. at 676. See generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The
Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 301 (1989) (discussing the
influence of campaign money on the candidates elected).
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Once officials are in office, they still are not free of the grip of
interest group politics. Both the House and Senate are constantly lobbied
to support certain measures, to create certain measures or to destroy
certain measures-all in a single day's work.'8' In the House, there are
more occasions for lobbyists to contact members directly than in the
Senate, 8 ' but the influence of lobbying groups is nonetheless felt in both.
The President is arguably more removed from the influence of lobbying
groups, which can be a good thing, but this isolation can also remove him
from the opinions and wishes of the population.'83
The Legislative Branch tends to be more protectionist and more
easily influenced by local and special interests than the office of the
President. This is one reason the President has traditionally been granted
so much authority in making trade decisions.'84 To include further
congressional oversight into this process would seem only to slow down
the trade process and perhaps make the President victim to the individual
wants and desires of committee members.' This is in addition to the
'81 See generally JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI
GULCH 176 (1987) (explaining the influence of lobbyists on the passage of legislation).
182 See ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 283
(1990).
113 See HAROLD SEIDMAN & ROBERT GILMOUR, POLITICS, POSITION, AND POWER 38
(1986) ("The structure, procedure, and culture of Congress tends to obscure the general
interest, encourage particularism, and create an environment in which organized interest
groups and special pleaders can be assured a sympathetic response."). This is not to say
that the President is not also subject to lobbying. See EDWARD V. SHNEIER & BERTRAM
GROSS, LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY 218 (1993) ("MCs and leaders of private organizations
will often call upon a president or write him beseeching letters in an effort to obtain the
decision they prefer."). The primary difference lies in the fact that the President is
removed from regional concerns to the point that any decision that she makes will be
placed under the media spotlight and, unlike members of Congress, she cannot defend
her decision by stating that she was doing what was best for her particular geographic
area. The whole nation is her area!
84 See DESTLER, supra note 163, at 262 (arguing that fast-track should be narrowed in its
scope, but remains an effective vehicle for pushing various trade agreements). Destler
believes that congressional oversight may need to be enacted in certain areas of trade
negotiation, but, unlike Smith, appears to acknowledge that the execution of "fast track"
law is important to assure that Congress does not interfere once a deal has been
negotiated. See id. at 264.
"' This preference for a centralized policy maker is similar to the argument over the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of centralized decision making in enforcing
and regulating environmental laws. In short, the environmental movement is often
confronted by "industrial firms, developers, unions and others with incentive to avoid
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pragmatic argument that one focus is better than over 535 different
environmental controls." Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, in
FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 163, 164 (Richard L. Revesz et al.
eds., 1997). Such interest groups can afford to spend enormous amounts of money on
the formation of convincing arguments to keep environmental regulations low. See id.
Although there are many environmental lobbying groups around the country, few have
the individual resources necessary to adequately defend the interest of the environment
against such forces. See id. The technical complexity of environmental issues usually
"exacerbates this disparity by placing a premium on access to scarce and expensive
scientific, economic, and other technical information and analytical skill." Id. By having
the environmental regulatory power centralized in Washington, the government makes it
easier for environmental interests to organize and convey their concerns effectively. See
id.
At one time, industry lobbyists were tom between lobbying state government
and the federal government, but now such businesses take a more concentrated aim
toward Congress-appealing to the short term sensibilities of Congressional
representatives and the constituents who vote for those members of the House or Senate.
Senator Fulbright once noted that "congressmen are acutely sensitive to the influence of
private pressure and to excesses and inadequacies of a public opinion that is all too often
ignorant of the needs, the dangers, and the opportunities in our foreign relations."
CHARLES W. KEGLEY, JR. & EUGENE R. WITTKOPF, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:
PATTERNS AND PROCESS 403-04 (1982).
One cannot go far on Capitol Hill without seeing a lobbyist or two
communicating with members of Congress. See generally RICHARD E. COHEN,
WASHINGTON AT WORK: BACKROOMS AND CLEAN AIR (1992) (detailing the intimate
relationships that lobbyists and Congressmen have with each other). This publication is
of particular interest to this Note as it covers the politics that went into the writing of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. For example, "[i]ncluded [in discussions with
House members] were top officials from Exxon and Mobil, plus lobbyists from Amoco
and the Washington-based American Petroleum Institute." Id. at 160.
Of course the argument can be made that a conservative like Representative
Tom DeLay may very well become President and undue years of good works. Such an
argument makes two large assumptions. First, it assumes that the President is deaf to the
concerns of constituents, when in fact, the President is still subject to popular opinion,
but on a national scale. Therefore, if the public is frustrated with environmental
interference, the President may be forced to weaken existing laws.
The second, even larger assumption is that Congress is powerless, which is far
from the truth. Indeed, the entire debate over the President's negotiation powers
somehow undermining environmental laws ignores the realities that Congress still must
vote to accept any change in regulations proposed by the Executive Branch. See, e.g.,
supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text (explaining how the EPA regulations
originally agreed upon with Venezuela were barred from financial appropriation by the
House of Representatives).
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perspectives. This is no way to conduct foreign policy.'86
B. Weakening of the Environment?
It is certainly a valid concern that domestic regulation could
possibly suffer at the hands of the President and administrative agencies if
there were no safeguards. 7 When making this argument, however, it is
important to recognize that special and local interests do not just convince
members of Congress to weaken trade laws-they do the same for
environmental laws as well.
A recent example of such influence straight from the Republican
Congress is House Majority Whip Tom DeLay. "In the past two years, he
has tried to repeal the Clean Air Act, fought to cut the EPA's budget by a
third, and invited corporate lobbyists and contributors to pen legislation
exempting their industries from environmental laws."'88 It should come as
no surprise that Mr. DeLay's Congressional District is home to "a
Monsanto chemical plant, a BASF chemical plant, a mercury-
contaminated Superfund site, and a Dow Chemical plant that is the largest
industrial complex in North America."'89
186 See 143 CONG. REC. S12520-03 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997). This speech is the perfect
example of a typical, rhetorical speech given by a Senator in opposition to certain United
States policies. Senator Dorgan states in the middle of his speech that there is a "flood of
unfairly traded Canadian grain that is undercutting our farmers' interests." Id. at
S12521-03. Of course the problems of American grain farmers are important, but
imagine if every single Senator and Representative decided to choose his or her own
interest group that did not like a certain trade policy and represent that position on the
floors of Congress. Protectionism hurts the economy, but sounds wonderful in
soundbites. Factionalism would take over foreign relations and nothing effective would
occur, just as Madison feared.8 7 See Wirth, supra note 135, at 334. See also Smith, supra note 8, at 1285-1286.
'88 Jan Reid, Poison and Pork, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 40. The BASF
company is located in Houston, Texas, and gave over $51,000 to the Republican Party
over the past year. See Center for Responsive Politics, Individual Donors Name Search:
BASF (visited Mar. 28, 1999) <http//www.crp.org/indivs/cgi-win/indivs.exe>. Dow is
also in Houston, Texas, and gave over $198,000 to the Republican Party over the past
year. See id. Monsanto gave at least $25,000 to the Republican National Committee
over the past year. See id.
19 See Reid, supra note 188, at 40. Tom DeLay raised over $1,202,379 for his race in
the 22d District in Texas. See Center for Responsive Politics (visited Mar. 28, 1999)
<http://www.crp.org/politicians/index/h4TX22023.htn>. It should come as no surprise
that the industry that contributed most to his campaign was Oil & Gas, shelling out over
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Obviously not all members of the House of Representatives are as
anti-environmental regulation as Mr. DeLay, but recent actions by the
Congress seem to indicate that he is far from alone. A good example is
illustrated by the Emergency Salvage Timber Rider, a legislative
modification which was passed in 1995.' It allowed for the "cutting of
millions of board feet of additional timber in areas that had been declared
off-limits" by previous statutes. 91 There had been little debate or
discussion on the rider and the circumstances were such that the President
was in a rush to pass the actual Rescissions Act in order to aid Oklahoma
City bombing victims.' 92 The result was a law that may have some very
negative, long-term effects on the last ten percent of old growth left in the
United States, not to mention the habitats of several species of wildlife. 93
Congressional oversight is not always a good idea, especially in
attempting to carve out exceptions to environmental legislation.'94
IX. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
While our system of government was founded upon the art of
compromise and discussion, in no small part thanks to the efforts of James
$64,650. See id.
' Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25, 12,
16, 18, 20, 23, 26, 28, 36, and 42 U.S.C.)
'1 See Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Alter of
Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 457, 466
(1997).
192 See The Emergency Salvage Timber Rider, 16 U.S.C. § 1611 (1995). See also
Backdoor Tactics to Forest Management: The Emergency Salvage Timber Rider of H.R.
1944, 16 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 216 (indicating that H.R. 1944
contained "a rider permitting expeditious timber sales of salvage and green timber from
federal lands without substantial compliance with federal environmental statutes, while
simultaneously limiting judicial review of such sales.") [hereinafter Backdoor Tactics].
'
93 See Backdoor Tactics, supra note 192, at 216.
'9 It would be unfair to the 104th Congress to ignore two Acts that arguably strengthened
environmental laws. The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, 42 USC § 300f
(1994 & Supp. 1996) and the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 21 USC § 301 (1994
& Supp. 1996). Although this session of Congress was particularly "anti-environment"
in the beginning, many members came to realize that these laws were important to
constituents. These laws were passed in the final weeks before recess. See Robert V.
Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Regulatory Policy, U. CHI. LEGAL F.
159, 169 (1997).
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Madison' 5 and his fear of factionalism, environmental issues cannot
always be compromised. The environment is not limitless and problems
of pollution often are not restricted to our nation's borders. "The Earth's
assimilative capacity can be reached over time either because pollutants
cumulate or because emissions levels rise beyond the capacity of the
relevant ecosystem to process waste."' 96 All environmentalists agree that
as the world's economy continues to grow and the planet becomes more
and more industrialized, our laws will have to adapt and adjust to the
problems of international pollution, waste and destruction.' 97
The World Trade Organization/GATT has proven to be the prime
supporter of free trade and at least two scholars argue that the
environmental movement should have a similar organization in place to
guarantee the enforceability of international environmental laws.'98
Although the arguments for the formation of such an organization are
strong from an environmental perspective, the likelihood of the American
government willingly giving up sovereignty to an international
organization that has the public good in mind, (as opposed to the
furtherance of private interests through free trade) seems small. One need
only look at recent congressional comments on the United Nations to
recognize that we are nowhere near the creation of such an organization
that could call the United States a member.'99
,9. See MADISON, supra note 175, at 82 ("However small the Republic may be the
representatiVes mutst b -}1.ed to a certain number in order to guard against the cabals of
a few.").
196 ESTY, supra note 9, at 11.
197 See, e.g., id. at 17-21 (explaining the problems and realities of "ecological
interdependence").
198 See RUNGE, supra note 1, at 100-08. See also ESTY, supra note 9, at 58-59, 230-3 1.
199 See 143 CONG. REC. S9755-01 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1997) (statement of Senator Gregg)(noting that despite the fact that the United States owes about $1 billion in arrears,Congress would refuse to pay it because the institution is "rampant with mismanagement
and inefficiencies."). See also Carla Anne Robbins, House Abortion Foe Threatens
Powerful Interests by Thwarting US. Payments to the UN. and .M.F., WALL ST. J.,Dec. 10, 1997, at A24 (reporting that Representative Chris Smith and the abortion lobby
succeeded in stopping the U.S. Congress from voting to repay nearly $1 billion in backdues to the United Nations and $3.5 billion to the International Monetary Fund); RichardE. Cohen, Feuding over Family Planning, NAT'L J., Nov. 29, 1997, at Al (quoting
Presidential press secretary Mike McMurry, calling it "utterly boneheaded for Congress
to fail to meet our commitments that the United States has at the U.N."); 19 U.S.C.A. §3535 (1994) (providing that Congress will analyze the U.S. involvement in the WTO
every five years and that Congress can end United States involvement in the WTO
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In the absence of a centralized environmental organization, diverse
institutions are given the task of attempting to meet international
environmental problems through limited means. There are several UN
agencies dealing with assorted environmental problems; the World Bank
has recently taken on various environmental challenges; there are
secretariats to several environmental treaties and conventions that oversee
environmental issues; and one must not forget the dozens of committees,
panels, and interest groups that have been created with the sole purpose of
fighting environmental destruction.2" The fact is that over 190 countries
are trying to implement their own individual environmental laws-some
extremely liberal by United States standards, some far more
conservative."01 Many developing countries claim the United States too
often attempts to "bully" them into environmental laws that their
economies cannot sustain, a procedure referred to as "ecoimperialism."2 2
These countries claim that this prevents them from being able to develop
to the level that United States has achieved through over one hundred
years of development." 3 The result of all of these organizations, treaties,
and claims is "treaty congestion," making "systematic analysis of risks
across problems and other aspects of coordination nearly impossible."2"
The logical question that must then be asked is how to guarantee
strong environmental laws without causing international discord (which
often leads to weaker laws in the long run). The answer may turn out to be
through the World Trade Organization. Although it was not written to be
an environmental enforcement organization, as times change, so does
public opinion, and the WTO has the amazing power to directly and
indirectly affect foreign investment. In a post-cold-war world, economic
force influences domestic policy a good deal more than military force." 5
through a joint resolution-reflecting the concern many members have about
international agreements).
20 See ESTY, supra note 9, at 78.
201 See id.
202 See id. at 25.
203 The United States has the world's largest economy, which means it also carries a great
deal of the burden in regulating the balance between economic prosperity and
environmental destruction. See generally LESTER BROWN, STATE OF THE WORLD 1997
7-10, 132-150 (1997).
204 ESTY, supra note 9, at 78.
205 See Arthur E. Appleton, Telecommunications Trade: Reach Out and Touch Someone?,
19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 209, 209-212 (1998). "More recently, the application of
military pressure has given way to the utilization of economic pressure as a means of
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The appeals decision in Reformulated Gasoline20 6 appears to be a strong
indication that the dispute resolution process at the WTO may be the
perfect forum in which to further the environmental movement.
X. REFORMULATED GASOLINE REVISITED
An analysis of the differences between the Tuna-Dolphin Panel2 7
decisions on the one hand, and the Reformulated Gasoline Panel2 8 and
Appellate Board20 9 decisions on the other, reveals the environmentally
enlightened approach taken by the WTO. In the initial Tuna-Dolphin
dispute, the GATT Panel found that the embargo "was not justified as
relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources." 210 In fact, it
stated that the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) was "not
primarily aimed at the conservation of dolphins"' and was therefore a
violation of Article XX(g). The decision was "read as undermining the
fabric of all international environmental efforts and making more difficult
the already-challenging task of getting broad adherence to global
environment programs., 212  It is exactly this free-trade, anti-
environmentalist attitude that so many environmental activists fear.
Indeed, it is this attitude that some believe will lead the WTO into
chipping away at the various administrative regulations that protect the
daily lives of Americans in all areas of regulatory life-from the
environment to our health-care system to various labor programs."'
Ignoring the means by which the United States applied the
MMPA,21 4 it is clear from the history of the legislation that the law was
achieving policy objectives. The use of legal instruments to preserve the results achieved
has also become common and accepted." Id. at 212. See also Anne Q. Connaughton,
Factoring U.S. Export Controls and Sanctions Into International Trade Decisions, 27
STETSON L. REV. 1211, 1219 (1998) (noting that it is economic sanctions, not military
action, that have become Congress's tool of "first" resort in foreign policy).2 Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5.
207 See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 52; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 52.
28 See Panel Report, supra note 85.
21 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5.
210 RUNGE, supra note 1, at 73.
211 Id. at 133.
212 ESTY, supra note 9, at 30.
213 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 8.
214 The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1411-18, 1421, 1421a-
1421h, 111 Stat. 1027 (1997).
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passed with the primary purpose of protecting dolphins."' The Panel
ignored the realities of the situation and looked for underlying purposes
that were not there in defining the exceptions available in Article XX(g). 2 16
Three years later, the Panel in the Reformulated Gasoline case made the
exact same mistake and environmentalists threw up their hands in
disgust.217
If the Appellate Body had agreed with the Panel in this assessment,
then this Note would not be drawing the optimistic conclusions that
follow. However, as explained earlier, the Appellate Body proved to be
extremely understanding, insightful, and very aware of the realities of the
environmental movement. The findings of the Appellate Body may prove
to be the best thing that has happened to the environment in a very long
while.
The Appellate Body found that the Panel erred in its decision and
that the Clean Air Amendments were indeed "relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." 218
Although in the end the effect was the same as the Panel's ruling, this was
because of the chapeau requirement that the United States attempt to find
some way to logically harmonize trade standards. Simply put, the WTO
required that the United States take the rest of the world into consideration
when enforcing a measure that would affect the rest of the world!
If the United States had attempted in good faith to find an
215 See 16 U.S.C. § 1361(4) ("negotiations should be undertaken immediately to
encourage the development of international arrangements for... conservation of... all
marine mammals").216 See RUNGE, supra note 1, at 73.
217 See Panel Report, supra note 85, at 6.40.
The Panel saw no direct connection between less favourable treatment
of imported gasoline that was chemically identical to domestic
gasoline, and the U.S. objective of improving air quality in the United
States. . . .Accordingly, it could not be said that the baseline
establishment methods that afforded less favourable treatment to
imported gasoline were primarily aimed at the conservation of natural
resources.
Id. See also Waincymer, supra note 38, at 155.
218 Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5, at 15. "The United States must have been aware
that for these established techniques and procedures to work, cooperative arrangements
with both foreign refiners and the foreign governments concerned would have been
necessary and appropriate". Id. at 31.
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alternative route to the protectionist provisions, the Appellate Body
seemed to indicate that the Amendments would have met the requirements
of both XX(g) and the chapeau."1 9 How amazingly wonderful for global
environmentalists. 220  As noted earlier, one of the chief arguments for
those who support strong environmental laws is that environmental
problems do not end at any natural or artificial boundary.22'
Environmental law and the environmental movement are, by their nature,
international and not constricted to nation-state boundaries. A strong
environmental law that has taken only U.S. interests into consideration
may appear to be beneficial in the short term, but may doom the
environment in the long run if businesses choose to merely invest in other
countries that have weaker environmental laws-the proverbial "race to
the bottom."
On the other hand, if the U.S. attempts to enforce environmental
restrictions on other countries abroad, the result might be weakened
relations between the two countries and assuredly, U.S. businesses who
wish to take advantage of the growing markets overseas will show their
frustration with both their votes and their checkbooks. The urge to ignore
the views of other countries or to be "ecoimperialists" is strong, especially
considering that the United States is currently the only so-called
superpower on Earth.222  History has shown that neither protectionism
(e.g., the Smoot-Hawley Act and the consequences that followed)2 3 nor
forced morality (e.g., colonialism) will reap any long-term benefits. The
movement toward sustainable development is founded upon similar
philosophies.224
After the Reformulated Gasoline decision, environmentalists may
219 See id. (noting that the United States "had not pursued the possibility of entering into
cooperative arrangements with the governments of Venezuela and Brazil or, if it had, not
to the point where it encountered governments that were unwilling to cooperate.").
220 See ESTY, supra note 9, at 114-130 (suggesting a different test by which WTO panels
can apply Article XX). It is possible that with the new, respectful attitude that the
Appellate Board took in Reformulated Gasoline such a reformation of the test may not be
necessary.
222 See supra notes 197-198 and accompanying text.
222 See 143 CONG. REC. E2372-03 (1997), 143 CONG. REC. E-2338-01 (1997) and 143
CONG. REC. E-2346-03 (1997) (statements by Representatives Jerry F. Costello, Marcy
Kaptur, and Tim Roemer that they rejected the "fast-track" legislation because it did not
respect environmental and human rights in other countries).221 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
224 See Wirth, supra note 135, at 183.
[Vol. 23:299
REFORMULATING RELATIONSHIPS
find the WTO to be the best friend they have ever had. Indeed, the WTO
seems finally to be recognizing the significance of the environmental
movement, in no small part due to an increased awareness of ecological
problems around the world. For example, in 1997, the WTO Secretariat
organized a symposium with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on
Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development.22 At the event,
business leaders met with organizations that represented various
environmental and international factions."' One need only visit the WTO
website to see that the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) that
was established by the WTO General Council in January 1995 has made
an effort to address the traditional trade and environmental issues.227 It
therefore should come as no surprise that the Appellate Body was willing
to recognize an environmental law as exempted from normal WTO
restrictions, as long as the "violating" nation-state was willing to consider
the resources and possible effect such practical limitations would have on
other countries.
It does not seem so absurd to assume that had the EPA contacted
Venezuela and every other major gasoline exporter and offered to discuss
possible baseline standards in a diplomatic fashion, the agency's actions
would have satisfied the Appeal Board's criteria, even if Venezuela had
completely rejected the idea.
A. Executive Branch Strengths and Limitations
The point in noting the apparent shift in the WTO toward a
recognition of the viability of domestic environmental laws and the effects
of special and local interests on the Congress is to damage, if not kill, two
underlying assumptions made by those who fear this trend of the growing
power of the Executive Branch. First, this does not mean that the EPA is
going to necessarily "race to the bottom" and leave our environmental
laws hollow and pitiful because the WTO says it should. The WTO gets
all of its power from its participating nation-states who desire private
investment opportunities, of course, but also from nation-states who resent
commands from outside nations or organizations that tell them how to
225 See Background to WTO Work on Trade and Environment (visited Mar. 28, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/environ/backgrou.htm>.
226 See id.
227 See id. at <http://www.wto.org/environ/environm.htm>.
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protect the welfare of their citizens. After the Reformulated Gasoline
decision, it may be safe to say that the WTO will allow any environmental
exception as long as it appears to deal logically with an environmental
issue within the coverage of Article XX, the government can show that it
made a good faith effort to inform affected trade partners about the
potential constraints, and the government is allowed to prove that it
pursued the possibility of alternative multilateral or mutual agreements
before the law was passed (if such alternatives were rationally possible).228
Secondly, one must look seriously at the logic of those who wish
for more public oversight of the actions of administrative agencies in pre-
dispute discussions and who suggest consultation with various
congressional committees in a similar fashion to one of the steps currently
available for adjudicated settlements.229 The assumption is that "more is
better" in shaping public policy, but as indicated earlier, this is not always
the case.23 In the matters of trade, it makes sense that "deals through
democracy" might ruin any chance for meaningful trade relations. Thus,
the President has a great deal of independence in this area under the
Constitution.23'
In the matter of the environment, the same argument can be made.
By allowing the EPA, a member of the Executive Branch, to initially alter
administrative regulations without the delay and other problems that
further legislative process would bring, in order to comply with standards
considered acceptable by the WTO, we will find ourselves in a situation
that improves, strengthens, and gives credibility to environmental laws.
228 Undoubtedly, the WTO will be extremely strict in applying these criteria, as past cases
have shown that Article XX-is to be translated narrowly. Therefore, it must be shown
that the United States truly did attempt to deal with Venezuela and found that a
reasonable agreement was not possible between the two countries that would consider the
integrity of the environmental provision.
229 See Smith, supra note 8, at 1284.
230 See supra notes 159-186 and accompanying text.
231 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (designating the President the "Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States" and specifying that, subject to the approval of the
Navy, the President has the power "to make Treaties" and "appoint Ambassadors."). See
also U.S. CONST. art II, § 3 (stipulating that the President "shall receive Ambassadors
and other public Ministers.").
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XI. CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS AND BALANCES AND PROPOSED
CHANGES
As noted earlier, the Hill is run in large amount by the local and
special interests of the American populace.232 As a rule, Senators do not
write legislation. They leave such responsibilities to staff members or
outside lobbying organizations.233 These interests also watch the actions
of the President and the various administrative agencies under his care
carefully."' Therefore, if new environmental law standards are introduced
to Congress, chances are extremely good that someone will be aware of
the change and notify some Senator or House member. If the change is
significant enough, then the legislative body might merely choose not to
allow funding for the change in the law.235
Critics argue that Congress cannot be expected to be aware every
time such changes are made and that as the WTO's influence continues to
grow, more such changes will occur,236 weakening the power of
congressional oversight. Although this may be true, Congress still has an
obligation to its citizens to pay attention to the decisions made by
administrative agencies.237
Certainly, there appears to be a disproportion of knowledge and
comprehension available to administrative agencies that Capitol Hill
32 See supra notes 175-186 and accompanying text.
233 In response to Smith's claim that congressional oversight would be more democratic,
many laws are drafted with little public purview and many committee meetings are held
privately. For example, in the case of the 1990 Clean Air Amendments, "virtually the
entire clean-air bill was drafted behind closed doors-in the Senate, in the House and in
the conference committee." COHEN, supra note 185, at 172. Further legislative oversight
does not necessarily mean a more democratic process.
234 See COHEN, supra note 185, at 172.
235 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 (assigning Congress the power to provide for the common
defense, "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations .... to define and punish Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high Seas... to declare War ... to raise and support
Armies... to provide and maintain a Navy; [and] to make Rules for the Government and
Regulations of the land and naval Forces."). See also U.S. CONST., Art. 2, § 2 (the
Senate must give its advice and consent to all treaties and ambassadorial appointments).236 See Smith, supra note 8, at 1279.
237 Most administrative agencies are created by Congress, which delegates some
lawmaking authority to those agencies. Senators and Representatives take an oath of
allegiance to "be bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this Constitution.... I will
well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter." Oath
of Office, in CONGRESS A TO Z 278 (Congressional Quarterly, Inc.) (1993).
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cannot expect to achieve. Obviously, those who choose to work for the
EPA may have more of a vested interest and knowledge of environmental
issues than most congressional staff members. After all, one would
assume that the ecologists, scientists, engineers and attorneys who create
EPA standards have a great deal of knowledge in this area." 8 Nonetheless,
all of this must be considered with the fact that congressional staff
members are assisted by dozens of environmental and trade lobbying
organizations that are more than willing to even the playing field.23 9
If the EPA, which has been granted its power by Congress, chooses
to have secret discussions, comes to an agreed settlement with foreign
nations and introduce these changed standards to Congress for appropriate
funding, it has fulfilled the role for which it was created.24° If Congress
believes that the standards set forth are inappropriate, it can choose to
reverse the agency's action through legislation, summon the appropriate
EPA authorities and demand an explanation, or simply refuse funding and
the EPA will have no recourse but to work under the stipulations that
Congress believes appropriate to create agreeable regulations.2 ' Congress
already retains a great deal of influence over administrative decisions; it
seems illogical and counterproductive in this era of "cutting back" the
government that we strive to actually increase the complexity and extent
of legislative oversight.
238 The debate over the powers of administrative agencies is not a new one. Indeed, it is
one of the cornerstones of administrative law. In Crowell v. Benson, 285 US 22 (1932),
the Supreme Court recognized the importance of administrative agencies and noted the
necessity of deference to the decisions of experienced administrative judges/committees
in cases involving public (versus private) rights. Obviously, coupled with the Court's
traditional deference to the President in matters of foreign policy, one cannot help but
wonder if it has acquired a wisdom particular to the Judicial Branch over the years that
recognizes such a thing as too much oversight.239 See COHEN, supra note 185, at 1.
240 See Environmental Protection Agency Purpose and Functions, 40 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1999)
("The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency permits coordinated and effective
governmental action to assure the protection of the environment by abating and
controlling pollution on a systematic basis. . . . EPA reinforces efforts among other
Federal Agencies with respect to the impact of their operations on the environment").
241 "WTO Panel Reports have no force under U.S. law. In particular, federal agencies are
not bound by any finding or recommendations included in WTO Panel Reports, and such
reports do not provide legal authority for federal agencies to change their regulations or
procedures." Wirth, supra note 135, at 358 n.82 (quoting Mickey Kantor, United States
Trade Representative (Jan 18, 1996)).
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A. An Administrative Procedural Solution to Ex Parte Communications
Of course, it would be foolish to ignore the disturbing private talks
of the EPA with the Venezuelan government arid the underlying potential
of such discussions. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which
pertains to the Environmental Protection Agency, prohibits ex parte
communications informal adjudications and rulemaking, but the same
requirements do not apply to informal rulemaking.242 Section 307 of the
Clean Air Act establishes the informal rulemaking procedures under the
Act. The specified procedures state nothing about ex parte
communications.243 In this absence of direction, the legislative and
judicial procedures governing APA rulemaking apply.
The appeals court in Sierra Club v. Costle noted that "[i]f Congress
wanted to forbid or limit ex parte contact in every case of informal
rulemaking, it certainly had a perfect opportunity when it enacted the
Government in the Sunshine Act."2" Arguably, a court cannot impose
further procedural restrictions on agencies beyond what has been expressly
allowed by the statute or is specifically required by the Constitution,
leaving a great amount of responsibility in the hands of the agencies to
determine how to best regulate ex parte communications.24 s The courts
have also proven extremely deferential in informal rulemaking that may
involve foreign affairs functions.246
Because the current Congress has at times proven to be hostile to
many agencies, in particular those regulating the environment,247 opening
up the debate over EPA procedures on the floor of the House and Senate
would not likely result in any legislative decision beneficial to the
environment. However, to allow the EPA to constantly hold
242 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(14) (1994) (defining ex parte
communication). See also Wirth, supra note 135, at 358-60.
243 See 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1994) (laying out administrative procedures and judicial review
under the Clean Air Act). See also Wirth, supra note 135, at 358.
244 Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
241 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (holding that administrative agencies "should be free to fashion
their own rules of procedures" and allowing judicial interference only if "constitutional
constraints" or "extremely compelling circumstances" exist).
246 See, e.g., International Board of Teamsters v. Pennsylvania, 17 F.3d 1478, 1486 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
247 See Zellmer, supra note 191, at 463-64.
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environmental standard negotiations behind closed doors leads one to
"assume that such discussions have the adversarial qualities characteristic
of 'settlement' negotiations ... [that] might well subvert the integrity of
the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. ' ,24 At least two authors
address similar fears that this could lead to future domestic environmental
laws that are compromised before a case is ever filed before the WTO. 249
The solution to this problem may lie in the hands of the President
himself. The Judicial Branch may be formally barred from creating
further administrative procedures beyond those granted by statute or the
Administrative Procedure Act,250 but the President has the ability through
the power of Executive Orders to require stronger procedures or more
detailed decisions from administrative bodies.2 1' The EPA and the Clean
Air Act Amendments are already bound by APA "notice and comment"
requirements when proposing changes in the rules. The WTO
Reformulated Gasoline decision indicated that the Appellate Body was
discouraged, not by the EPA's recommendations, but by its unwillingness
to seriously consider discussing domestic potential regulations with
foreign governments and companies that would have adverse affects on
those international parties. 3
In theory, it is possible that affected parties could have submitted
concerns with the EPA during the required thirty-day comment period
required by the APA.2 54 However, in the reality of international affairs,
248 Wirth, supra note 135, at 358.
149 See id. at 363. "[S]uch 'internalization' may be unhealthy for the democratic decision
making process." Id. See also Smith, supra note 8, at 1280 ("The erosion of democracy
resulting from the Executive Branch's dual role as advocate for the United States inWTO negotiated settlements and domestic lawmaker presents a dilemma ... [and] is an
unsatisfactory way to make domestic policy.").
250 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553, 556, 557 (1994). See also Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 555(stating that the court's role in reviewing sufficiency of agency consideration is limited).
251 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987) (requiring federal
agencies to preempt state rulemaking only after notice and comment opportunity to all
affected states); Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994) (requiring each
federal agency to identify and address the environmental impact of its programs, policies,
and activities on minorities and low income populations).
252 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (specifying rulemaking
procedures which include notice and comment procedures); Registration of Fuels and
Fuel Additives, Base Fuel Specifications, 40 C.F.R. § 79.55 (requiring the publishing of
notice of base fuel changes in the Federal Register).
253 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5, at 26-29.
214 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d). "The required publication or service of a substance rule shall
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affected parties may never have easy access to copies of the Federal
Register or other resources necessary to effectively convey complaints in
the traditional thirty to sixty-day window.
The Executive Branch is left with only two alternatives if it wants
to avoid the possibility of a complaint being filed with the WTO and being
assured of a losing argument. One alternative would permit the EPA to
communicate, often secretly, with foreign officials, as it did in the
Venezuela scenario-a situation that can lead to a great deal of political
debate, distrust, and criticism. Alternatively, the President can issue an
Executive Order specifying requirements of administrative agencies that
distinguish between foreign governments or manufacturers and domestic
parties. In the furtherance of the President's power to shape foreign
policy, agencies could be required to send notice directly to international
parties potentially affected by the regulation, requesting comments and
input."' Such an Executive Order would most likely require an extended
time period for external comment considering the realities of international
communications and the high probability of meetings between concerned
foreign government officials and individuals." 6
be made not less than 30 days before its effective date." Id.
255 The majority of WTO members have embassies in Washington, D.C., and law finms
that represent them as counsel in the United States. Contacting countries does not mean
that contact need be overseas-notice could be given to representatives in the United
States.
256 Clearly, contacting countries individually might prove expensive or burdensome. One
wonders if mere publication in the Federal Register would suffice. Poorer countries that
lack the resources to review the Federal Register on a regular basis may argue that this
alternative is insufficient. The problem with individual contacts would be the concern
that some party might be missed, and as a result, demand compensation or retribution.
There is also, of course, the concern of cost, although one letter per party does not seem
cost-prohibitive.
There are those who argue that Congress is the only appropriate body to make
these decisions. See Wirth, supra note 135, at 363 (stating that Congress is the "forum
for settling such trade disputes . . . to guarantee adequate public access to domestic
decisionmaking processes in areas affected by the actions of multilateral trade bodies,
and to counterbalance to the considerable aggrandizement of unilateral Executive Branch
power otherwise fostered by the domestic implant of international trade agreements").
While it is true that the EPA is not currently bound by the Sunshine Act of 1976,
5 U.S.C. § 552(b), to report ex parte communication before formal notice and comment
procedures commence, there are alternatives to further Congressional oversight. If the
President wishes to respect the WTO's policy of harmonization and foster an atmosphere
of open communications in sensitive areas such as this (where foreign policy influences
domestic actions, thereby calling into question separation of powers issues), then an
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To best illustrate this possible change in administrative procedures,
it might be helpful to imagine how such a system would have been utilized
in the Reformulated Gasoline case. The EPA could have sent individual
companies notice that it was intending to make rules involving
reformulated gasoline baseline standards immediately, and then followed
the notice by extending the comment period for any concerns or
discussions that may ensue from interested foreign parties, such as
Venezuela. All discussions and meetings that did not pertain to national
security could be included in the record, meeting concerns of ex parte
communications and preventing the tide of criticism that actually occurred
in this scenario.
Such an alternative would appear to farther the concerns of the
WTO for international harmonization and respect. It would respect the
integrity of the administrative state and administrative process. It would
most likely satisfy the concerns of critics of closed-door negotiations, and
most importantly, it would avoid the risks that come with further
Congressional oversight." 7
Executive Order such as proposed above would be ideal. The Order could specify that
any contacts made with foreign parties during the enlarged notice and comment time
period would be subject to procedures similar to those mapped out by the District Court
in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("If ex parte contacts
nonetheless occur, we think that any written document or a summary of any oral
communication must be placed in the public file established for each rulemaking docket
immediately after the communication is received so that interested parties may comment
thereon."). The need for secrecy in situations such as this would be slim, as the EPA
could be honest about its respect for the WTO, but its even stronger interest in creating a
law "primarily aimed at conserving an exhaustible natural resource." See Article XX,
supra note 51.
Further, David Wirth himself states that "so far as can be determined from the
dockets for both rulemakings .... relevant conversations between EPA employees and
Venezuelan governmental authorities appear in the record." Wirth, supra note 135, at
357 n.79. He does note that it was unclear if oral communications between staffers of
other agencies and Venezuelan authorities were on the record, and it appears that these
communications are the sources of Wirth's own unease. See id.
... Smith does propose that "the head of the relevant department or agency be provided
an opportunity for public comment by publishing in the Federal Register the proposed
modification and an explanation for the modification." Smith, supra note 8, at 1291.
This requirement actually already exists under the APA's notice and comment
regulations. Smith suggests "an amendment to the URAA to extend rulemaking
negotiation settlements to the procedures that currently apply to rulemaking pursuant to
WTO adjudicative rulings." See id. Under the proposed Executive Order above,
Congress need not act to extend the procedural restrictions to be applied by the
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B. Congress is Free to Amend Legislation or Attach Riders
In addition to its power to refuse to appropriate funding to
implement certain standards, Congress is always free to pass new
amendments to various environmental laws if it fears that somehow the
laws are being compromised. Of course, if Congress is worried that
international businesses will somehow benefit at the expense of certain
domestic industries or communities, Senators or Representatives can
always write in exceptions that name no specific business, but in actuality
are extremely protectionist." 8  In this way, the legislature could
circumvent the fear that the President would order the EPA to refuse to
enforce the exceptions. The interesting thing about this scenario would be
the perception of the environmentalist who fears the "race to the bottom."
On the one hand, Congress may disagree with the EPA's policies and
chooses to clearly state the United States' position on environmental laws,
while on the other hand the laws may be weakened anyway thanks to all of
the various exceptions listed in the amendments.
When the EPA attempted to change the baseline standards for
reformulated gasoline refiners after meeting secretly with Venezuela,
Congress successfully refused to fund the new measures through a rider.2"9
Riders are provisions, sometimes symbolic but often substantive, that
members of Congress tack on to appropriations bills before a final vote is
taken.260 In some ways, riders are an environmentalist's worst nightmare
because they can lead to significant policy changes without "public input
or legislative accountability." 261 In the environmental context, laws that
are short-term solutions to environmental problems, or apparent minor
exceptions to environmental regulations, can have particularly destructive
long term effects.262
administrative agency. This is the traditional responsibility of the Executive Branch and
further Congressional interference would do little but add to the difficulties of making
foreign policy and environmental regulations.
258 See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 185, at 159 (recognizing that Representative Henry
Waxman was successful in carving out an exception to the Clean Air Act Amendments
for Califomia-allowing the state to set separate motor vehicle standards).259 See Smith, supra note 8, at 1268.
261 See Zellmer, supra note 191, at 457.
261 id. at 457.
262 See id. at 457-6 1.
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C. The Danger of Riders
Appropriation riders can have deadly effects on the environment.
Historically, members of Congress have come dangerously close to
destroying years of scientific research, judicial decision-making and
legislative precedent by attaching riders during the appropriations
process. 263 In fact, "[r]epublican leaders in the 104"' Congress made
strenuous efforts to dismantle decades of environmental law. When their
proposals to change the law were unsuccessful in regular legislative
channels, riders were attached to appropriations bills. '" 2 4
The 104th Congress attached more than fifty environmental riders
to spending bills when all was said and done, although many of these were
not enacted.265
While some critics fear that the executive body is placing the
balance of powers at risk through ex parte communications about
changing domestic regulations with WTO Members,266 there are others
who believe that the real danger to the system of checks and balances is
the use of riders by Congress.267 In effect, by avoiding the political
263 See id. at 463-64.
264 Id. at 464.
26s See id. Zellmer's best example is the Rescissions Act of 1995. See Emergency
Supplemental Appropriation for Additional Disaster Assistance 1995, supra note 190.The Act was signed into law by President Clinton in order to make emergency
supplemental appropriations for the victims of the Oklahoma bombing tragedy.
Representative Charles H. Taylor (R-NC) and Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA) took
advantage of the situation and attached the Emergency Salvage Timber Rider in the
appropriations committees of both houses. See Emergency Salvage Timber Rider, supra
note 192. It was supposed to help provide funding for the Act, create jobs for thosedependent on federal timber and help protect the forest from insect infestation and forestfires. It is questionable if any of these goals were met and the negative effects of the
rider have been extreme. See Zellmer, supra note 191, at 465-466. "The effects of thebill have been dramatic, causing the cutting of millions of board feed of additional timberin areas that had been declared off-limits, and using methods that but for the rider wouldhave been prohibited by a variety of environmental statute." Id. Although
environmentalism is popular in America, it is not the timber or the endangered species
that eventually vote for elected officials. On the other hand, if the riders had beenindependent bills they probably would not have been passed. See id. at 491 ("This is badpolicy.... Such change would not be sustained in the heat of open debate.").266 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 8, at 1270; Wirth, supra note 135, at 357-59.
267 See Zellmer, supra note 191, at 457 (arguing that riders underpin the democratic
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process of traditional congressional deliberation and by forcing the
President to pass a law because of the underlying, perhaps unrelated,
scheme of the bill, Congress actually intrudes into traditional executive
territory.268
Riders often mirror the interests of the constituents of the
Representative or Senator who introduced them,26 9 which may be fine for
the short term goals of one particular area of the country, but may
seriously place the long-term health of the environment at risk.27 Such
riders clearly have a place in the case of actual regional emergencies,27" ' but
it appears that in other cases such provisions are abuses of process and
violate a rational understanding of the system of checks and balances. 2
Therefore, one might argue that in order to protect the
environment, as well as retain the system of checks and balances put in
place by the Founders, Congress should be forbidden from using riders in
all cases except actual emergencies. One critic recommends a
Constitutional amendment to prohibit substantive legislation by
appropriation273 and several states follow this model.274 It is not the
purpose of this Note to expound on possible alternatives to the current
system of riders, only to identify that a problem exists and to suggest that
perhaps it is Congress, and not the Executive Branch, that is excessively
intruding into Constitutional functions of another branch of government
and placing the environment at risk in the process.
XII. THE SHRIMP-TURTLE DECISION
No analysis of Reformulated Gasoline275  and free trade/
environmental tensions can be complete without a reference to the ruling
process and undermine the process of regulation formulation).
268 See id. at 521 ("Appropriations riders often fly in the face of the Executive's
constitutional responsibilities to veto objectional laws and to enforce laws that are
enacted"). See id. at 520 ("Excessive rider-tacking has seriously eroded the integrity of
the tripartite, republican democracy established by the Framers, who envisioned the
legislature not only as a representational body, but also as a deliberative body.").
269 See id. at 495.
270 See id. at 472-492.
272 See id. at 535.
.
22 See id. at 518-534.
213 See id. at 534.
274 See id. at 534, nn. 268, 439.
275 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 5.
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of the WTO Appellate Body in Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products (Shrimp-Turtle).276 The decision affirmed the premise of
this Note that the WTO is conscious of the environmental needs of
Member countries and is willing to accept environmental regulations
under the Article XX list of exceptions, as long as the rational concerns of
international importers are honestly taken into consideration.
Shrimp-Turtle involved regulations issued in 1987 by the United
States pursuant to the Endangered Species Act of 1973.27  These
regulations required all U.S. shrimp trawl vessels to use approved Turtle
Excluder Devices (TEDs) or two-time restrictions in specific areas where
sea turtles were at risk due to the harvesting of shrimp.278 One particular
provision of those regulations, section 609,279 called upon the development
of bilateral or multilateral agreements to protect sea turtles, and created a
certification program through which countries that did not use approved
shrimp harvesting methods could not trade with the United States.280
Malaysia, Thailand and Pakistan all requested the formation of a
Dispute Settlement Body to examine the U.S. shrimp prohibitions as a
violation of GATT Article XII. 28' The United States argued that the
environmental provisions were clearly within the scope of Article XX(g),
but nonetheless the WTO Panel found the shrimp-turtle laws to be
inconsistent with the country's obligations under GATT.8 2 The U.S. filed
an appeal, and on October 12, 1998, the Appellate Body issued its own
ruling.2 83 For purposes of this Note, the Appellate body decision is
important because it not only used the analysis described by Reformulated
Gasoline, but it actually signaled on several occasions that the
chapeau/section (g) analysis used by the Appeals Body in Reformulated
Gasoline284 is the proper standard for future Panels to follow.28
276 See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/R, (Apr. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle].
277 See id. para. 2. See also Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 16
U.S.C. 1531 et. seq.
278 See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 276, para. 2.
279 See 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244 (1987).
210 See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 276, para. 3.
281 See id. para. 7.
282 See id.
283 See id. para. 187.
284 See supra notes 122-127 and accompanying text.
285 See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 276, para. 118.
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The Appellate Body began its analysis by reversing the Panel's
legal conclusion "that the United States measure at issue 'is not within the
scope of measures permitted under the chapeau of Article XX."'286 Citing
Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body stated that the proper
sequence of interpreting Article XX is to first apply one of the listed
exceptions, and then to apply the general chapeau clause afterward.287
This sequence, which was not followed by the Panel,288 is extremely
important, because to start with a broad analysis first would basically
exclude all environmental laws, since by their very nature such laws
discriminate against fair trade.28 9 Every law claiming to be an Article XX
exception will be different, and therefore a logical analysis demands that
the specific analysis come first.29' This is the first legacy of Reformulated
Gasoline.
Next, the Appellate Body found that "the sea turtles here involved
constitute 'exhaustible natural resources' for purposes of Article XX(g) of
the GATT 1994,'291 and that "Section 609 is a measure 'relating to' the
conservation of an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning of
Article XX(g). ' 292 It also found that "Section 609 is a measure made
effective in conjunction with the restrictions on domestic harvesting of
shrimp, as required by Article XX(g). '293 In making these determinations,
the Appellate Body referred to Reformulated Gasoline as the decision by
which the proper standards were instituted.294
Turning next to the chapeau analysis, the Appellate Body found
that section 609, in effect, established "a rigid and unbending standard by
which United States officials determine[d] whether or not countries will be
certified."2 9 The United States did not allow certification for those who
used TEDs that were comparatively effective, but not exactly like the U.S.
method,296 nor did it bother to negotiate with all Members that export
286 Id. para. 123.
2 7 See id. paras. 118-22.
288 See id.
289 See id. para. 120.
290 See id.
'9' Id. para. 134.
292 Id. para. 142.
293 Id. para. 145.
294 See id. paras. 136, 141, 143.
'9' Id. para. 163.
296 See id. para. 165.
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shrimp to the United States.297 It also failed to follow the directive of
section 609 to develop bilateral and multilateral agreements 298 and in effect
"require[d] other Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive
regulatory program . . without taking into consideration different
conditions which may occur in the territories of those other members. 299
All of these factors led to the determination by the Appellate Body that the
effect of section 609 was unjustifiably discriminatory3 ° and that the
discrimination was "arbitrary" for purposes of the Article XX chapeau. 31'
Just as in Reformulated Gasoline, the Shrimp-Turtle Appellate
Body appeared willing to allow a U.S. environmental law to claim an
exception under Article XX, but only if it showed a willingness to notify
and take into consideration affected Member countries. In both cases, the
United States failed the chapeau requirements of Article XX, not because
the laws were environmental and therefore protectionist in nature, but
because the government showed an unwillingness to communicate with
other members of the global community. This represents neither an
extremist free trade perspective nor an extremist environmental
perspective, but speaks to the credibility of the WTO Appellate Body, in
that it logically took into consideration the interests of both the
environment and free trade.
XIII. CONCLUSION
A strong economy must promote free trade. A strong environment
needs to have the support of laws that are internationally harmonized and
consistent. The movements for free trade and environmental protection
come from extremely different paradigms--one based upon the idea of
unlimited ideas and resources, where less governance is the best
governance,30 2 the other based upon an opposite foundation that resources
are limited and government regulation is a necessity.3 3 Nonetheless, for
297 See id. para. 172.
298 See id.
299 Id. para. 164.
31 See id. paras. 172, 176.
301 See id. para. 184.
302 See Wirth, supra note 135, at 334; ESTY, supra note 9, at 36-39 (explaining the
different views of the world from the eyes of free trade supporters and
environmentalists).
31 See Esty, supra note 9, at 36-39.
REFORMULATING RELATIONSHIPS
both to exist and be effective in the future, the Executive Branch must be
allowed a good deal of freedom in negotiating the standards by which both
areas of regulation are applied.
Free trade is not free if it is weighted with exceptions.
Environmental laws cannot be protective if every other business is
exempted. These are areas in which Madison's ideas of a large
government composed of various factions and governed by compromise
falls short. Some things cannot be compromised.
As shown by this Note, there are critics who fear that the
movement toward free trade will lead to a weakening of domestic
environmental laws. There are also scholars who object to
Presidential/Executive power infringing on traditional legislative functions
of domestic regulation, in the name of foreign affairs responsibilities.
These critics recommend further legislative oversight and further
institutional safeguards to hinder this growth of executive power.
As revealed in this Note, local interests and industry lobbyists help
guarantee that Congress will often sacrifice long-term environmental
protection laws that are good for the entire nation, in order to protect short-
term, regional goals. The same happens when free trade laws that might
promote business closure in certain regions are introduced. Such facts
suggest that any increase in legislative interference in the passage of
environmental and trade measures should be discouraged and rejected.
For those concerned about ex parte communications involving the
"watering down" or "undermining" of U.S. laws between the EPA or
USTR and other countries, again, there is no need for further legislation.
Instead, an Executive Order, such as that suggested here, that extends
"comment" procedures and increases "notice" requirements for
international parties potentially affected by U.S. regulations would be
more than sufficient. In this manner, U.S. communications would no
longer be exparte, but in the public record, and foreign policy discussions
involving domestic regulations could still prove effective.
All of these debates and discussions center around a genuine fear
of the power of the World Trade Organization and its ability, through the
Executive Branch, to find domestic environmental laws to be direct
violations of free trade responsibilities. As this note summarized, there are
still plenty of safeguards in place to protect U.S. law if the legislators are
doing their job and choose to control appropriations or place riders on bills
to prevent a change in domestic law. However, as the Reformulated
Gasoline decision shows, there is probably little to fear and the WTO may
prove to be more of an aid than a detriment to the protection of the
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environment in the long run.
The Reformulated Gasoline decision revealed that the WTO was
more than willing to allow a country to pass strong environmental
regulations and laws, as long as those environmental laws were universally
upheld to all parties-domestic and international alike. The decision
noted the importance of communication between countries, and would
have allowed the Venezuelan/gasoline standards as acceptable restrictions
on trade under GATT Article XX, if the United States had shown an
attempt to communicate with affected international parties. As it is, the
United States never indicated that it was willing to consider the discussion
of a solution just as effective, but less painful to international gasoline
providers until after regulations were already in place. The Shrimp-Turtle
decision further supported this interpretation, noting the importance of
communication between Member nations.
The free trade and environmental movements often work in
opposite directions. However, as the WTO showed in Reformulated
Gasoline, if countries communicate between themselves and work
together, it is possible to have environmental laws that coincide nicely
with free trade initiatives. In the end, the problems do not lie in the goals
of the various movements, nor in the ideology and views of the WTO
Appellate Body. The true enemies to the environmental and free trade
movements are those who choose short-term regional interests over the
long-term good of humanity and the world.
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